# Neg vs. Indiana HF

# 1NC

### 1NC - COP

### \*\*\*1NC – FTC independence module

The FTC should issue enforcement guidance that the presently-existent phrase “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce” in Section 5 of the FTCA includes prohibiting predatory and limit pricing. The FTC should release a clear statement and data sets that reflects this and enforce accordingly

#### The cplan solves. It also competes – the FTC interprets current authority, instead of creating new prohibitions.

Kahn ‘21

et al; This is a recent joint statement released by the five Federal Trade Commissioners. The Chair of the Federal Trade Commission is Lina Khan - an Associate Professor of Law at Columbia Law School. Also on the Commission is Rohit Chopra – who was previously The Assistant Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, as well as Rebecca Slaughter - an American attorney who was previously the acting chair of the Federal Trade Commission. Two others also sit on the Commission. “STATEMENT OF THE COMMISSION On the Withdrawal of the Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act” - July 9, 2021 - #E&F – modified for language that may offend - https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public\_statements/1591706/p210100commnstmtwithdrawalsec5enforcement.pdf

Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce.”1 In 2015, the Federal Trade Commission under Chairwoman Edith Ramirez published the Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act (hereinafter “2015 Statement”), which established principles to guide the agency’s exercise of its “standalone” Section 5 authority.2 Although presented as a way to reaffirm the Commission’s preexisting approach to Section 5 and preserve doctrinal flexibility,3 the 2015 Statement contravenes the text, structure, and history of Section 5 and largely writes the FTC’s standalone authority out of existence. In our ~~view~~ (perspective), the 2015 Statement abrogates the Commission’s congressionally mandated duty to use its expertise to identify and combat unfair methods of competition even if they do not violate a separate antitrust statute. Accordingly, because the Commission intends to restore the agency to this critical mission, the agency withdraws the 2015 Statement.

I. Background

On August 13, 2015, the Federal Trade Commission issued the 2015 Statement, which announced that the Commission would apply Section 5 using “a framework similar to the rule of reason,” by only challenging actions that “cause, or [are] likely to cause, harm to competition or the competitive process, taking into account any associated cognizable efficiencies and business justifications[.]”4 The 2015 Statement advised that the Commission is “less likely” to raise a standalone Section 5 claim “if enforcement of the Sherman or Clayton Act is sufficient to address the competitive harm.”5

In a statement accompanying the issuance of these principles, the Commission explained that its enforcement of Section 5 would be “aligned with” the Sherman and Clayton Acts and thus subject to “the ‘rule of reason’ framework developed under the antitrust laws[.]”6 In a speech announcing the statement, Chairwoman Ramirez noted that she favored a “common-law approach” to Section 5 rather than “a prescriptive codification of precisely what conduct is prohibited.”7 She also acknowledged that the Commission’s policy statement was codifying an interpretation of Section 5 that is more restrictive than the Commission’s historic approach and more constraining than the prevailing case law.8 She added, “[W]e now exercise our standalone Section 5 authority in a far narrower class of cases than we did throughout most of the twentieth century.”9

With the exception of certain administrative complaints involving invitations to collude, the agency has pled a standalone Section 5 violation just once in the more than five years since it published the statement. 10

II. The Text, Structure, and History of Section 5 Reflect a Clear Legislative Mandate Broader than the Sherman and Clayton Acts

By tethering Section 5 to the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the 2015 Statement negates the Commission’s core legislative mandate, as reflected in the statutory text, the structure of the law, and the legislative history, and undermines the Commission’s institutional strengths.

In 1914, Congress enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act to reach beyond the Sherman Act and to provide an alternative institutional framework for enforcing the antitrust laws. 11 After the Supreme Court announced in Standard Oil that it would subject restraints of trade to an open-ended “standard of reason” under the Sherman Act, lawmakers were concerned that this approach to antitrust delayed resolution of cases, delivered inconsistent and unpredictable results, and yielded outsized and unchecked interpretive authority to the courts.12 For instance, Senator Newlands complained that Standard Oil left antitrust regulation “to the varying judgments of different courts upon the facts and the law”; he thus sought to create an “administrative tribunal … with powers of recommendation, with powers of condemnation, [and] with powers of correction.”13 Likewise, a 1913 Senate committee report lamented that the rule of reason had made it “impossible to predict” whether courts would condemn many “practices that seriously interfere with competition, and are plainly opposed to the public welfare,” and thus called for legislation “establishing a commission for the better administration of the law and to aid in its enforcement.”14 These concerns spurred the passage of the FTC Act, which created an administrative body that could police unlawful business practices with greater expertise and democratic accountability than courts provided.15

At the heart of the statute was Section 5, which declares “unfair methods of competition” unlawful.16 By proscribing conduct using this new term, rather than codifying either the text or judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act, the plain language of the statute makes clear that Congress intended for Section 5 to reach beyond existing antitrust law. The structure of Section 5 also supports a reading that is not limited to an extension of the Sherman Act. Notably, the FTC Act’s remedial scheme differs significantly from the remedial structure of the other antitrust statutes. The Commission cannot pursue criminal penalties for violations of “unfair methods of competition,” and Section 5 provides no private right of action, shielding violators from private lawsuits and treble damages. In this way, the institutional design laid out in the FTC Act reflects a basic tradeoff: Section 5 grants the Commission extensive authority to shape doctrine and reach conduct not otherwise prohibited by the Sherman Act, but provides a more limited set of remedies.17

The legislative debate around the FTC Act makes clear that the text and structure of the statute were intentional. Lawmakers chose to leave it to the Commission to determine which practices fell into the category of “unfair methods of competition” rather than attempt to define through statute the various unlawful practices, given that “there were too many unfair practices to define, and after writing 20 of them into the law it would be quite possible to invent others.”18 Lawmakers were clear that Section 5 was designed to extend beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. 19 For example, Senator Cummins, one of the main sponsors of the FTC Act, stated that the purpose of Section 5 was “to make some things punishable, to prevent some things, that cannot be punished or prevented under the antitrust law.”20

The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this view of the agency’s Section 5 authority, holding that the statute, by its plain text, does not limit unfair methods of competition to practices that violate other antitrust laws. 21 The Court, recognizing the Commission’s expertise in competition matters, has given “deference”22 and “great weight”23 to the Commission’s determination that a practice is unfair and should be condemned.

#### *Next off is FTC independence:*

#### FTC independence in the US key to *global norms* that support agency independence. Vital for *free trade* and *GLO*.

* United States’ FTC practices are modeled *by several nations* – including South Korea – and *will continue to be modeled* by nations that are still amid transitions towards industrialization;
* Global attentiveness to the United States’ FTC practices *remains ongoing* and - “*to this day*” - are a *central obstacle* to aspired free trade norms;
* The root of the loss of the global public’s confidence in free trade stems from the success of zero-sum strategies. *The root of that* is an interpretation of the FTCA that permits politicized intervention;
* Ambiguity in the United States’ FTCA permit the Act to be exercised *EITHER with a great deal of agency discretion* – *OR* alternatively, *with the perceived influence of external political branches*;
* Current US FTC practices lean away agency independence – and that’s *a central obstacle* to international agencies countering the growth of protectionist mercantilist norms
* More broadly, this hampers *general support for internationalism/GLO*

Nam ‘18

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ABSTRACT:

The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (“FTC Act”), a model for many other countries that set up their own competition agencies, combines the control afforded by presidential appointment and removal powers over FTC commissioners with an exceedingly discretionary mandate. This Article contends that the FTC Act’s outmoded openness to strong presidential direction, where adapted abroad, has helped detract from antitrust regulator independence. Even advanced players in the liberal international economic order such as South Korea have made use of the United States’ original blueprint for unitary executive-stamped antitrust enforcement without sharing a long historical evolution of counterbalancing regulatory norms, e.g. the judicial check that was Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).

Strong executive direction in antitrust enforcement is particularly suited to capitalist economies helmed by administrations with mercantilist policies, given their belief that the state and big business must cooperate in the face of zero-sum international competition. South Korean President Lee MyungBak’s term (2008-2013) serves as an apt recent case study, featuring dirigiste calibration of antitrust enforcement against a backdrop of global recession. This Article examines the parallels between the FTC Act and the South Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (“MRFTA”) before scrutinizing the enabled silo-like enforcement patterns of the Korean Fair Trade Commission under the Lee administration. Increasingly widespread erosion of public confidence in free and competitive trade demands a better understanding of the forces preventing global convergence in antitrust enforcement, and of their roots.

We have created, in the Federal Trade Commission, a means of inquiry and of accommodation in the field of commerce which ought both to coordinate the enterprises of our traders and manufacturers and to remove the barriers of misunderstanding and of a too technical interpretation of the law. —President Woodrow Wilson, September 1916

[Our companies] are fighting with unfavorable conditions amid competition in the global economy. To do so, they must be allowed to escape various regulations. Let’s take just a half step forward to move beyond the pace of change in the global economy. —South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, March 2008

It is clear that, at the beginning of the 21st century, we cannot afford to operate, to enforce our competition laws, in national or regional silos. We must not remain isolated from what happens in other jurisdictions. Even if markets often remain regional or national in terms of competitive assessment, fostering global convergence in our legal and economic analysis is essential to ensuring effectiveness of our enforcement and creating a level playing field for businesses across our jurisdictions. —Joaquín Almunia, Vice-President of the European Commission for Competition Policy, April 2010

The [U.S.] Agencies do not discriminate in the enforcement of the antitrust laws on the basis of the nationality of the parties. Nor do the Agencies employ their statutory authority to further nonantitrust goals. —The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, April 1995

INTRODUCTION

The International Competition Network’s founding in October 2001, with the aim of “formulat[ing] proposals for procedural and substantive convergence” among its stated goals,5 sought to usher in a future with more cosmopolitan and coherent global antitrust enforcement. Although U.S. regulatory leadership maintained that “consistently sound antitrust enforcement policy cannot be defined and decreed for others by the U.S., the EU, or anyone else,” many countries (turned) ~~looked~~ to the U.S. as a role model while developing their competition regimes.6 It is ironic, then, that to this day a central obstacle to the aspired international “culture of competition” can be found in none other than the influence of the U.S.’s own FTC Act.7

American antitrust priorities around the time of the legislation’s passage oscillated between tempering trusts and shepherding business to further national economic strength, all towards the domestic interest. They shaped a regulatory environment that would reemerge abroad in many later-developing countries.

The deepening global retreat from internationalism *and* free market principles in the present day, with the specter of trade wars looming, is exacerbated by nationalist competition regimes that are derivative of a U.S. model predating the modern world economy. Domestic critics of open markets often overlook the U.S.’s own past vis-à-vis protectionist governments today. Illiberal or nominally liberal, they walk the kind of dirigiste path once treaded by the American School through the early twentieth century.8

#### Globally, independence of antitrust agencies will prove key – checks spiraling economic nationalisms that’ll crush liberal peace.

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National antitrust silos are not a novel phenomenon. Former European Commissioner for Competition Joaquín Almunia warned of them years ago,152 and scholarship touching upon the furtherance of nationalist goals by various antitrust agencies dates back decades.153 However, a creeping loss of public confidence in open markets—coupled with the obstacles to coherent global antitrust enforcement that bear the FTC Act’s influence, as illustrated in this Article—risks amplifying the problem. As anti-free trade agendas continue to garner more mainstream popularity for formerly counter-establishment parties, a proliferation of protectionist silos could tempt even governments that, for the most part, had moved past them. Why, American officials may ask, should the U.S. continue championing the liberal international economic order when an illiberal China or an ostensibly liberal South Korea bends regulatory rules to disadvantage American companies, workers, and consumers? Skepticism towards a liberal democratic “end of history”154 in general, and failures of economic liberalism in particular, are threatening to motivate political circles accordingly. Even perennial norms and conventions of the U.S. competition regime which evolved to safeguard regulator independence at home are no longer above disruption; the ambiguous statutory articulations that carried over abroad to empower strong executives are likewise playing a paper tiger role domestically of late.155

Protectionist policies designed to compromise market competition—for all its documented excesses and inadequacies—would sap its creative vitality and the concurrent liberal peace156 often taken for granted. Economic liberalism ails not so much from the intrinsic failings of core tenets, but from their more egregious nation-state and corporate violators. Proposals for greater accountability and harmonization have ranged from presumption of an underlying coordination scheme in antitrust investigations of a culpable country’s companies,157 to an international competition regime binding on member states in at least some areas of antitrust.158 Each has associated costs, but their very debate harnesses polycentric dialogue lacking in nationalist regulatory agendas and calls for “our country, right or wrong” protectionist silos. It should be emphasized to policymakers and politicians collectively that lasting convergence in antitrust enforcement is unachievable without global coherence in regulator autonomy, and the FTC Act’s formative influence is not above scrutiny or reproach. Still-elusive realization of the liberal economic international order’s intended form will require an expanded constellation of independent competition regulators empowered to enforce antitrust laws consistently.

#### Global free trade reversals will cause *multiple existential impacts*.

* Arctic conflict
* Space conflict;
* Global nuclear prolif;
* Structural wars;
* Climate;
* Geo-engineering;

Langan-Riekhof ‘21

et al; Maria Langan-Riekhof is the Lead Author and is the new Director of the Strategic Futures Group at the National Intelligence Council, leading the Intelligence Community’s assessment of global dynamics and charged with producing the quadrennial Global Trends product for the incoming or returning administration. She has spent more than 27 years in the intelligence community as both a senior analyst and manager, serving at the CIA and on the NIC. She brings a background in Middle East studies and has spent more than half her career analyzing regional dynamics. Her leadership roles include: Chief of the CIA’s Red Cell, founder and director of the CIA’s Strategic Insight Department, and research director for the Middle East. She was one of the DNI’s Exceptional Analysts in 2008-09 and the Agency’s fellow at the Brookings Institution in 2016-17. She is a member of the Senior Analytic Service and the Senior Intelligence Service and hold degrees from the University of Chicago and the University of Denver - National Intelligence Council - Global Trends 2040 – Form the section: “Scenario Four – Separate Silos” - MARCH 2021 - #E&F - https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/GlobalTrends\_2040.pdf

With the trade and financial connections that defined the prior era of globalization disrupted, economic and security blocs formed around the United States, China, the EU, Russia, and India. Smaller powers and other states joined these blocs for protection, to pool resources, and to maintain at least some economic efficiencies. Advances in AI, energy technologies, and additive manufacturing helped some states adapt and make the blocs economically viable, but prices for consumer goods rose dramatically. States unable to join a bloc were left behind and cut off.

Security links did not disappear completely. States threatened by powerful neighbors sought out security links with other powers for their own protection or accelerated their own programs to develop nuclear weapons, as the ultimate guarantor of their security. Small conflicts occurred at the edges of these new blocs, particularly over scarce resources or emerging opportunities, like the Arctic and space. Poorer countries became increasingly unstable, and with no interest by major powers or the United Nations in intervening to help restore order, conflicts became endemic, exacerbating other problems. Lacking coordinated, multilateral efforts to mitigate emissions and address climate changes, little was done to slow greenhouse gas emissions, and some states experimented with geoengineering with disastrous consequences.

*Note to students*: this ev appears to advance a cemented future – but it is an ebook report by the National Intelligence Council outlining possible futures \*if\* certain premises were to take place. Perhaps this is best explained by an except from the opening of this report: “Welcome to the 7th edition of the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends report. Published every four years since 1997, Global Trends assesses the key trends and uncertainties that will shape the strategic environment for the United States during the next two decades. Global Trends is designed to provide an analytic framework for policymakers early in each administration as they craft national security strategy and navigate an uncertain future. The goal is not to offer a specific prediction of the world in 2040; instead, our intent is to help policymakers and citizens see (aware of) what may lie beyond the horizon and prepare for an array of possible futures”.

## States CP

### 1NC

Text: The 50 states and relevant territories should engage in multistate antitrust action and enforcement over The 50 states and relevant territories should:

* engage in multistate antitrust action and enforcement over prohibiting predatory and limit pricing and
* fund climate-smart agricultural projects and pharmaceutical drug development.

#### States solve best---multistate organizations, expanded jurisdiction, and can “fill the gap”

Rauch 20 Daniel E. Rauch J.D. Yale Law School. (2020 ). ARTICLE: SHERMAN'S MISSING "SUPPLEMENT": PROSECUTORIAL CAPACITY, AGENCY INCENTIVES, AND THE FALSE DAWN OF ANTITRUST FEDERALISM. *Cleveland State Law Review*, 68, 172. <https://advance-lexis-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/api/document?collection=analytical-materials&id=urn:contentItem:5YDM-6NS1-FCK4-G4MV-00000-00&context=1516831>. {DK}

In 2020, as in 1890, states attorneys general have much to offer antitrust enforcement. Illegal anticompetitive conduct is often concentrated locally, rather than nationally, making state-level enforcement especially appropriate. 202Link to the text of the noteMany states have antitrust statutes (or bodies of state law) that allow for prosecutions that the federal laws do not. 203Link to the text of the noteState governments often will have better knowledge of local economic conditions than distant agencies in Washington, making them natural choices for [\*210] antitrust enforcement. 204Link to the text of the noteAnd if the federal government fails to enforce the antitrust laws, state attorneys general often have the ability and political incentives "step up" to "fill the void." 205Link to the text of the note

Yet, if the early failure of antitrust federalism holds a single lesson, it is that even such compelling political, historical, and economic imperatives are, without more, insufficient to spur state antitrust action. Unless state prosecutors have the capacity and incentives to take on the antitrust challenge, they will not act.

What does this mean for today's state antitrust enforcers? On one hand, the years since 1890 have seen several innovations that substantially mitigate the problem of prosecutorial capacity. Multistate organizations like the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) have allowed for coordination and information sharing between attorneys general on antitrust matters, thus reducing the costs and burden of such cases. 206Link to the text of the noteLikewise, the rise of multistate antitrust suits brought jointly by dozens of states allows for cost-and-capacity-sharing. 207Link to the text of the noteChanges in federal law, like the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976, created an economic incentive for states to pursue antitrust cases by codifying the ability of state attorneys general to sue as parens patriae and by offering states treble damages when they prevail (a strong economic incentive if ever there was one). 208Link to the text of the note

Going further, the federal government has sometimes expressly subsidized state antitrust efforts, as with the supplemental funding offered in the Crime Control Act of 1976. 209Link to the text of the noteAnd in some states, the capacity of the attorney general's office has increased to levels inconceivable at the turn of the century: New York's Attorney General, for instance, supervises over 1,800 employees, 210Link to the text of the notewhile California employs a staggering [\*211] 4,500. 211Link to the text of the notePerhaps because of these shifts, it is unsurprising that in recent times at least some state attorneys general have heeded the call to enforce state and federal antitrust laws, from local investigations of healthcare consolidation 212Link to the text of the noteto multistate actions against Silicon Valley behemoths like Apple and Amazon. 213Link to the text of the note

## Politics DA

#### Biden’s PC is key to pass debt ceiling through reconciliation

Hartmann 9-30-21 (Thom Hartmann, writing fellow with the Independent Media Institute, #1 progressive talk-show host, carried on SiriusXM, Pacifica, radio stations nationwide, Free Speech TV, author of "The Hidden History of Monopolies: How Big Business Destroyed the American Dream," and more than 25 other books in print, “GOP Suicide Bombers Threaten Debt-Ceiling Sabotage of US Economy,” City Watch, 9-30-2021, https://www.citywatchla.com/index.php/375-voices/22694-gop-suicide-bombers-threaten-debt-ceiling-sabotage-of-us-economy)

There's plenty of coverage about how worried Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen is about how severe the impact an American default—or even a pause in issuing Treasuries, which are essential to the smooth functioning of the international monetary system—would be.

"I think there would be a financial crisis, and a calamity," Yellen told reporters yesterday.

But left unsaid was why Republicans would want such a "crisis" and "calamity." What's possibly in it for them?

After all, raising the debt ceiling has, on its face, nothing to do with Democrats' plans to spend $3.5 trillion or so on infrastructure over the next decade; that would be dealt with in future debt ceilings.

Why would the Republicans filibuster the debt ceiling, forcing the Democrats to burn through their one-reconciliation-bill-a-year?

Perhaps that question answers itself, although it is possible under Senate filibuster rules to have a separate reconciliation bill just to raise the debt ceiling; the problem is that doing so makes the entire reconciliation process for other things even more complicated.

So what do they want? Why the suicide vests?

When McConnell last tried this, then against President Obama eight years ago, the GOP had a list of demands that Must Be Met to stop them from blowing up the country along with themselves: cut taxes on the morbidly rich, turn Medicare into a welfare program, and make it easier for big refineries and coal mines to pollute our air and rivers.

This time it appears their goal is to stop President Biden's Build Back Better legislation, also known as the $3.5 trillion reconciliation bill, a failure which will damage the Democrats politically both with their base and with independent voters for 2022 and 2024.

In other words, it's all about splitting the Democratic base against itself while making President Biden look impotent so Republicans can regain control of the House and Senate and set up Donald Trump (or equivalent) to run for president in three years.

Reconciliation is a complex and time-consuming process, and if McConnell's threat works and Democrats have to come up with an entirely new reconciliation bill to raise the debt ceiling it'll burn through precious time and political capital needed to pass Biden's signature legislation.

Even if they roll the debt ceiling and funding the government into that larger bill, it'll take a startling amount of Senate floor time that gives giant special interests more time to carpet bomb TV and other media with propaganda opposing the $3.5 trillion Build Back Better legislation while they dangle ever more money and future income opportunities in front of wavering Democrats.

And, as a bonus, the American media will fail to blame this on the GOP: they'll go along with McConnell's line that it's all the Democrats fault, even though it was the Republicans who invoked the filibuster that forces reconciliation.

Just that sentence is complex enough that our media will default to a "Democrats Fail Again" headline instead of "Republican Suicide Bombers Threaten America with Such Damage That Democrats Kill Their Own Legislation To Save the Country."

#### Plan drains PC, provokes a time-consuming partisan battle

#### Collapses global finance

Hanlon 9-13-21 (Seth Hanlon, senior fellow for Economic Policy at the Center for American Progress, former special assistant to the president for economic policy at the White House National Economic Council, where he coordinated the Obama administration’s tax policy, JD Yale Law School, BA Harvard University, “Congressional Republicans Must Not Play Political Games With the Debt Limit,” Center for American Progress, 9-13-2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2021/09/13/503720/congressional-republicans-must-not-play-political-games-debt-limit/)

Ten years ago, the Republican leaders of the U.S. House of Representatives risked an unthinkable economic catastrophe in a reckless attempt to gain leverage in budget negotiations. They threatened to block an increase in the U.S. debt limit—a routine and necessary step that enables the government to make ongoing payments required by law without defaulting. The crisis was averted, but the episode caused significant harm to the economy.

The debt limit needs to be raised again this fall, most likely in October. But in recent weeks, 106 Republican House members and 46 Republican senators, including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY), have said they will not vote for a debt limit increase. They claim that President Joe Biden and the congressional majority bear sole responsibility for taking the necessary action to avoid default. These members of Congress’ position is deeply hypocritical: As this column explains and Figure 1 helps illustrate, many of their own actions and policies have made the debt limit increase necessary. Their position is also terribly irresponsible because failing to raise the debt limit would cause catastrophic harm to the entire country.

Figure 1

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Raising the debt limit is needed to preserve the full faith and credit of the United States

One of the bedrocks of the U.S. and world economy is the full faith and credit of the United States: the secure expectation that the U.S. government will pay its obligations in full and on time. The United States’ rock-solid credit allows financial markets to function and the country to pay low interest, or even negative real interest, to bondholders based on the certainty that they will be paid interest and principal on time. It also gives Americans, such as Social Security beneficiaries, veterans, military and federal civilian employees, beneficiaries of federal programs, and countless others, the security of knowing that they will receive the payments they rely on and are entitled to.

The United States has never defaulted on its obligations. The closest thing was a minor technical snafu in 1979 that was quickly fixed.

From time to time, Congress must raise the debt limit to prevent the country from defaulting. The debt limit is a 104-year-old provision that places a dollar cap on the total amount of outstanding debt that the Treasury Department can have to finance the government’s ongoing legal obligations. The debt limit is an unnecessary historical relic; almost no other comparable countries have one. The actual public debt is determined not by the debt limit but by the substantive spending and revenue laws that Congress passes.

In practice, the debt limit serves little function other than to potentially enable factions in Congress to force the United States to default on obligations it has already incurred—if they are reckless enough to do so.

The debt limit debacle of 2011 must not be repeated

Before 2011, parties in Congress never seriously threatened to force the United States into default to extract concessions. But then, the House Republicans’ reckless gambit brought the country to the brink of disaster. Even though the United States narrowly avoided default, the episode raised costs of borrowing for the government, private businesses, and homebuyers, and it slowed the already struggling economic recovery by undermining consumer and business confidence.

No good came out of the 2011 crisis. The resulting agreement produced an ill-conceived budget “sequester” that further slowed the economic recovery and resulted in chronic underfunding of key priorities.

Since 2011, every time the debt limit has needed to be raised, Congress has raised or suspended it without incident and on a bipartisan basis. Congress did so on a bipartisan basis seven times since that year: in 2013 (twice), 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018, and 2019.\* Then-President Barack Obama took the position after 2011 that he would never again negotiate over the debt limit. Similarly, the Trump administration repeatedly urged Congress to pass “clean” debt limit increases—that is, debt limit increases without conditions.

A majority of Senate Republicans, including then-Majority Leader McConnell, supported suspending the debt limit all three times it was needed under Trump.\* The most recent time, in 2019, McConnell explained:

[The debt limit suspension] ensures our federal government will not approach any kind of short-term debt crisis in the coming weeks or months. It secures our nation’s full-faith and credit and ensures that Congress will not throw this kind of unnecessary wrench into the gears of our job growth and thriving economy.

Raising the debt limit is just as imperative now as it was in 2019. The only difference in 2021 is that a Democrat sits in the White House.

A U.S. default would be catastrophic

When the United States reaches the debt limit, the Treasury Department cannot issue additional debt and therefore risks running out of cash. With the debt at the limit, the Treasury is now buying time through previously used accounting moves known as “extraordinary measures.” Unfortunately, those measures will probably only last into October, according to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen. At that point, the government will not be able to meet its ongoing legal obligations. It would default. And while no one knows precisely what that could mean, the consequences could entail:

* Social Security checks stopping, putting the livelihoods of millions at risk
* The military and federal workers not receiving their paychecks
* Providers such as hospitals and doctors not being paid for services provided under Medicare and Medicaid
* People filing taxes on extension this fall not getting the refunds they are owed, and monthly child tax credit payments ceasing
* Countless families and businesses being thrown into turmoil as they are stiffed on many other kinds of payments
* Critical government services shutting down

In addition, a U.S. default would cause chaos in global financial markets. Treasury bonds set the benchmark for the risk-free interest rate—and if the government suddenly defaults on the payments on those bonds, the financial system would be fundamentally uprooted. The financial system could melt down even worse than it did in 2008, drying up credit and grinding commerce to a halt.

As Treasury Secretary Yellen told Congress in June:

Failing to increase the debt limit would have absolutely catastrophic economic consequences. It would be utterly unprecedented in American history for the United States government to default on its legal obligations. I believe it would precipitate a financial crisis. It would threaten the jobs and savings of Americans, and at a time when we are still recovering from the COVID pandemic.

Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, said: “It would be financial Armageddon. It’s complete craziness to even contemplate the idea of not paying our debt on time.” And JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon said that a U.S. default “could cause an immediate, literally cascading catastrophe of unbelievable proportions and damage America for 100 years.” The American Enterprise Institute’s Michael Strain emphasized, “Even edging close to defaulting is dangerous,” and with as much as a temporary default, the “unthinkable might happen.”

#### Cascades to multiple intersecting existential risks – including nuclear wars, environmental destruction, and critical infrastructure – AND turns case – including implementation and enforcement capacity, alliances and authoritarianism

--VUCA = volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity

--JIT = just in time

Maavak 21 (Mathew Maavak, consultant at Risk Foresight, specializing in Strategic Foresight, Contingency Planning, Perception/Crisis Management, Energy and Resource Geopolitics, Defense and Security Analysis, PhD policy studies, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, MA International Communication, University of Leeds, “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?” Salus Journal, 9(1), 2021, https://salusjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Maavak\_Salus\_Journal\_Volume\_9\_Number\_1\_2021\_pp\_2\_17.pdf)

According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid-2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Figure 1: Systemic Emergence of Global Risks

The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak.

The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020).

As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007).

Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit.

According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019):

“You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author).

President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period.

A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016).

In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade.

ENVIRONMENTAL

What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation:

The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs.

Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated.

Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity.

Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021).

Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications.

On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabria-based ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008).

The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section.

Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade.

GEOPOLITICAL

The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic.

Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction-adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced.

Geopolitics will still be dictated by major powers. However, how will the vast majority of nations fare during this VUCA decade? Many “emerging nations” have produced neither the intelligentsia nor industries required to be future-resilient. Raw materials and cheap labour cannot sustain anaemic societies in a volatile world. Advances in material sciences and robotic automation as well as technological “ephemeralization” (Fuller, 1938; Heylighen, 2002) may shift manufacturing back to the Developed World.

In an attempt to mask the looming redundancy of these nations, untold billions have been wasted on vanity studies, conferences and technological initiatives drawn up by an army of neoliberal experts and native proxies. Risks were rarely part of the planning calculus. National and regional blueprints ranging from Malaysia’s Vision 2020, Saudi Vision 2030, ASEAN 2025 to Africa 2030, amongst others, will fail just as their innumerable precursors did.

The author defines a redundant nation as one which persistently lacks a comprehensive brain bank and an adaptive governance structure in order to be future-resilient. Redundant nations are preludes to failed states. They will lack native ideations and coherent policies that are critically needed in a VUCA decade. While policies intended to “promote growth in developing countries” had traditionally acted “as agents for conflict prevention” (Humphreys, 2003), the trade-off was often bureaucratic overgrowth, corruption, ethnoreligious discrimination and resource wastages.

Attempts to re-use these nations as geopolitical proxies a la the Cold War may prove too costly for potential sponsors. The Fat Leonard scandal (Whitlock, 2016) in Southeast Asia – which entrapped senior US naval officers in a web of sleaze – may be a harbinger of similar breaches on friendly territory, particularly as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) challenges US geopolitical hegemony worldwide. The BRI however snakes through many potentially redundant nations and may expose China to a “death by a thousand cuts” via geo-economic extortion. Beijing’s recent attempts to portray itself as a humanitarian superpower has somewhat backfired after numerous defects were discovered in its “medical aid” exports (Kern, 2020).

Ultimately, one should not underestimate the possibility, however remote, of national boundaries being redrawn before the Great Reset period is over. The global map was different only 100 years back. The once-mighty Soviet Union no longer exists while its former nemesis, the United States, faces social clefts of ominous proportions. Alarming parallels are now being drawn between the inauguration of President Abraham Lincoln on March 4, 1861 – which led to the US civil war – and the swearing in of Joe Biden as 46th President of United States on Jan 20 2021 (Waxman, 2021). How will a weakened United States affect NATO and the larger Western-led global alliance?

SOCIETAL

The WEF (2017) had pencilled “global social instability” as the biggest threat facing our collective future. A similar outcome was gamed out in a 2007 study by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre at the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (DCDC, 2007).

According to Peter Turchin (2016), a professor of Evolutionary Biology at the University of Connecticut, the United States may experience “a period of heightened social and political instability during the 2020s” – marked by governmental dysfunction, societal gridlock and rampant political polarization. To blame this phenomenon on the presidency of Donald J. Trump is to wilfully ignore the gradual build-up of various fissiparous forces over decades.

The social media plays a force multiplier role here. While risks metastasize at the bedrock levels of society, policymakers are constantly distracted from the task of governance by a daily barrage of recriminations, fake news and social media agitprops. As a result, longterm policy imperatives are routinely sacrificed for immediate political gains. The importunate presidential impeachment sagas and electoral fraud accusations in the United States are reflective of wider social fissures, state fragilities and policy paralyses worldwide.

There is nothing new in this panem et circenses (bread and circuses) phenomenon. Juvenal had noted a similar trend during Rome’s imperial decline circa 100 A.D. Recently, despite clear signals that the world was facing an economic catastrophe, the United Nations seemed more focused on the discovery of gender bias in virtual assistant software like Siri and Alexa (UNESCO, 2019). How will this revelation benefit the bottom 99% of humanity in dire economic conditions; one where the victims will be preponderantly women and children?

Just like in Imperial Rome, bread and circuses are symptomatic of an economic system that relentlessly benefits the elite. The mountain is ignored and the molehill is prioritized through controlled public narratives. The issue of “stolen childhoods”, for example, is now couched in terms of climate change rather than on sexual exploitation. Few take note that nearly “100,000 children – girls and boys – are bought and sold for sex in the U.S. every year, with as many as 300,000 children in danger of being trafficked each year.” Child rape, as John Whitehead (2020) further notes, has become “Big Business in America.” Not surprisingly, human trafficking has emerged as a $150 billion global industry (Niethammer, 2020).

Such shocking human rights failures do not figure prominently in the calculus of various “social justice” movements. The Top 1% needs their “useful idiots” – a phrase misattributed to Lenin – to generate a constant supply of distractions. Activist-billionaire George Soros, for example, is pumping $1 billion into a global university network to “fight climate change” and “dictators” which curiously include elected leaders such as former US President Donald J. Trump and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi. These “academically excellent but politically endangered scholars” (Open Society, 2020), as Soros calls them, may turn out to be the very disruptors who will “undermine scientific progress” in the West – just as Turchin (2016) predicted in his seminal study. Soros’ pledge was coincidentally made when COVID19 began to decimate the global economy and healthcare systems. Elite philanthropy is now an avenue for global subversion. An assortment of scholars, government officials and NGOs are already channelling the agendas of their well-pocketed patrons, backed by Big Tech’s control of the mainstream and social media (Maavak, 2020c). Their narratives are reminiscent of giddy sophistries which fuelled a variety of communist and anarchist movements during the build-up to WWII.

Under these circumstances, some nations may eventually seal their borders and initiate authoritarian measures in order to maintain internal stability. This is no longer an unthinkable proposition as dissatisfaction with democracy has peaked worldwide (Foa et al, 2020). Measures perfected by COVID-19 lockdowns may have inadvertently served as a test run in this regard.

## Innovation Adv.

### WARMING

#### Not existential AND their models fail.

Piper 19---Kelsey Piper, citing John Halstead climate change mitigation researcher at the Founders Pledge. [Is climate change an "existential threat" — or just a catastrophic one? 6-28-2019, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/6/13/18660548/climate-change-human-civilization-existential-risk]

I also talked to some researchers who study existential risks, like John Halstead, who studies climate change mitigation at the philanthropic advising group Founders Pledge, and who has a detailed online analysis of all the (strikingly few) climate change papers that address existential risk (his analysis has not been peer-reviewed yet).

Halstead looks into the models of potential temperature increases that Breakthrough’s report highlights. The models show a surprisingly large chance of extreme degrees of warming. Halstead points out that in many papers, this is the result of the simplistic form of statistical modeling used. Other papers have made a convincing case that this form of statistical modeling is an irresponsible way to reason about climate change, and that the dire projections rest on a statistical method that is widely understood to be a bad approach for that question.

Further, “the carbon effects don’t seem to pose an existential risk,” he told me. “People use 10 degrees as an illustrative example” — of a nightmare scenario where climate change goes much, much worse than expected in every respect — “and looking at it, even 10 degrees would not really cause the collapse of industrial civilization,” though the effects would still be pretty horrifying. (On the question of whether an increase of 10 degrees would be survivable, there is much debate.)

Does it matter if climate change is an existential risk or just a really bad one?

That last distinction Halstead draws — of climate change as being awful but not quite an existential threat — is a controversial one.

That’s where a difference in worldviews looms large: Existential risk researchers are extremely concerned with the difference between the annihilation of humanity and mass casualties that humanity can survive. To everyone else, those two outcomes seem pretty similar.

To academics in philosophy and public policy who study the future of humankind, an existential risk is a very specific thing: a disaster that destroys all future human potential and ensures that no generations of humans will ever leave Earth and explore our universe. The death of 7 billion people is, of course, an unimaginable tragedy. But researchers who study existential risks argue that the annihilation of humanity is actually much, much worse than that. Not only do we lose existing people, but we lose all the people who could otherwise have had the chance to exist.

In this worldview, 7 billion humans dying is not just seven times as bad as 1 billion humans dying — it’s much worse. This style of thinking seems plausible enough when you think about past tragedies; the Black Death, which killed at least a tenth of all humans alive at the time, was not one-tenth as bad as a hypothetical plague that wiped us all out.

Most people don’t think about existential risks much. Many analyses of climate change — including the report Vice based its article on — treat the deaths of a billion people and the extinction of humanity as pretty similar outcomes, interchangeably using descriptions of catastrophes that would kill hundreds of millions and catastrophes that’d kill us all. And the existential risk conversation can come across as tone-deaf and off-puttingly academic, as if it’s no big deal if merely hundreds of millions of people will die due to climate change.

Obviously, and this needs to be stressed, climate change is a big deal either way. But there are differences between catastrophe and extinction. If the models tell us that all humans are going to die, then extreme solutions — which might save us, or might have unprecedented, catastrophic negative consequences — might be worth trying. Think of plans to release aerosols into the atmosphere to reflect sunlight and cool the planet back down in the manner that volcanic explosions do. It’d be an enormous endeavor with significant potential downsides (we don’t even yet know all the risks it might pose), but if the alternative is extinction then those risks would be worth taking.

But if the models tell us that climate change is devastating but survivable, as most models show, then those last-ditch solutions should perhaps stay in the toolkit for now.

Then there’s the morale argument. Defenders of overstating the risks of climate change point out that, well, understating them isn’t working. The IPCC may have chosen to maintain optimism about containing warming to 2 degrees Celsius in the hopes that it’d spur people to action, but if so, it hasn’t really worked. Maybe alarmism will achieve what optimism couldn’t.

That’s how Spratt sees it. “Alarmism?” he said to me. “Should we be alarmed about where we’re going? Of course we should be.”

Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg has taken an arguably alarmist bent in her advocacy for climate solutions in the EU, saying, “Our house is on fire. I don’t want your hope. ... I want you to panic.” She’s gotten strong reactions from politicians, suggesting that at least sometimes a relentless focus on the severity of the emergency can get results.

So where does this all leave us? It’s worthwhile to look into the worst-case scenarios, and even to highlight and emphasize them. But it’s important to accurately represent current climate consensus along the way. It’s hard to see how we solve a problem we have widespread misapprehensions about in either direction, and when a warning is overstated or inaccurate, it may sow more confusion than inspiration.

Climate change won’t kill us all. That matters. Yet it’s one of the biggest challenges ahead of us, and the results of our failure to act will be devastating. That message — the most accurate message we’ve got — will have to stand on its own.

#### Even multi-trillion does NOT solve their climate impacts – most recent IPCC report

Thomsen-Cheek 8-13-21 (Kira Thomsen-Cheek, aka SninkyPoo, Communications Manager focusing on healthcare, IT and HR, University of Washington Medicine ICD-10 Program, BA Michigan State University, “Climate Code Red: We Have 5.5 Years.” Daily Kos, 8-13-2021, https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2021/8/13/2045542/-Climate-Code-Red-We-Have-5-5-Years)

With the IPCC report’s klaxons blaring “CODE RED,” the question arises: what is it in our power as individuals to do to ensure that the world does not warm beyond 1.5°C by 2100?What actions would YOU be wiling to take? Voting for Democrats got us the White House back, and (slim) majorities in both houses of Congress. As tremendous as that was, it won’t have been enough.

As reported in Earth and Sky– and ultimately derived from the IPCC report:

“The speed at which atmospheric carbon dioxide has increased since the industrial revolution (1750) is at least ten times faster than at any other time during the last 800,000 years, and between four and five times faster than during the last 56 million years.

About 85% of carbon-dioxide emissions are from burning fossil fuels. The remaining 15% are generated from land use change, such as deforestation and degradation.”

On August 9th, Greta Thunberg tweeted:

According to the new IPCC report, the carbon budget that gives us the best odds of staying below 1,5°C runs out in less than 5 and a half years at our current emissions rate. Maybe someone should ask the people in power how they plan to “solve” that?

The people in power who could make the biggest difference – the leaders of the countries with the highest percentage of global emissions – are presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping.

Under President Biden, the infrastructure bills currently making their way through the congressional sausage factory are woefully insufficient to cope with the need to reduce carbon emissions enough –or swiftly enough – to meet the US’s burden under the Paris Agreement. Biden’s stated goal is to cut the nation’s emissions by at least 50 percent by the end of this decade.

That is a worthy aim, but it is not enough. The United States is responsible for only 15% of global emissions annually, and per the IPCC report, our global carbon budget does not last until the end of this decade. It lasts until about 2027.

Even the $3.5 trillion dollar plan largely written by Bernie Sanders (and crafted in response to the known reality that Republicans would force Dems to water down the first plan) is unlikely to include enough action on, or money for, the rapid slashing of emissions and radical retooling of the economy that will be required to keep us under the 1.5°target.

As for the rest of the world? China is responsible for 28% of current annual global emissions – almost twice our rate. Russia produces 5% of the world’s annual emissions, while India produces 7%. Every other country on Earth, lumped together, produce the remaining 21%.

While President Xi Jinping may have talked a good story at this past April’s virtual climate summit, his stated goals are, as with President Biden’s, woefully insufficient.

"China will strive to peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before2060," the president said. "China has committed to move from carbon peak to carbon neutrality in a much shorter time span than what might take many developed countries, and that requires extraordinary hard efforts from China. We will strictly control coal-fired power generation projects. We will strictly limit the increase in coal consumption over the 14th five-year-plan period and phase it down in the 15th five-year-plan period."

Unless I am missing something, that was substantially the same as China’s position in 2020. The website Climate Action Tracker categorized China’s climate response then as “highly insufficient,” and consistent with global warming within 3°C and 4°C by 2100 – i.e., more than double the 1.5° that is now generally agreed upon as the upper “acceptable” limit.

With the 2 largest emitters on Planet Earth both doing far, far less than is needed to reduce emissions, perhaps there is a global push to at least stop looking for new sources of fossil fuels to plunder?

That would sound reasonable. It is not, in fact, the case.

Yesterday, I happened upon the following thread tweeted out by Extinction Revolution Cambridge. It appears to be immaculately sourced. It is terrifying.

Here’s just a taste:

US: Drilling in Alaska; record offshore oil and gas exploration, extracting 17m barrels a day, $323bn to be spent in 4 years(expenditure on climate under Biden’s infrastructure plan is $36bn).

UK: recently granted 113 licenses over 259 drilling blocks in the North Sea, two new platforms installed just last week (tweet was from this June).

Canada: the tar sands produce 3m barrels a day. Trudeau government just greenlit 3 new offshore sites off Newfoundland.

Uganda: \*423\* new wells with drilling led by Chinese national oil and gas company. Oil coming on stream 2025.

Nigeria: 100 new oil and gas sites coming into production between 2021 and 2024, one site alone producing 650,000 barrels every day, starting next year.

New Zealand: new exploration in the waters off the poster child for progressive climate politics.

Iran: 2.4 million barrels a day, up 400,000 barrels a day from April 2020. New discovery adds 2.2 billion barrels a day.

In sum, under current policies – and policies currently in the pipeline – emissions will not be slashed enough, or quickly enough, to avoid warming of more than 1.5°C.

Nations across the globe are continuing to seek out new sources of fossil fuels to power their growing populations and economies.

Leaders – the politicians who enact policies and the global billionaire ruling class who buy so many of those politicians (cough –Joe Machin – cough) – appear to be perilously close to adopting a modified “business as usual” stance. What would that look like, if it were to be what was happening right now in the United States?

A few strong words about climate change that appear to acknowledge our shared global peril.

A few hard-won (over the strenuous objections of Republicans) incremental policies that may have been enough if they’d been enacted 30 or 40 years ago.

Strong resistance to any change from the usual suspects.

Meetings with other global leaders to gather opinions, try to gain consensus, and agree on what can be done. Statements to follow. Inaction, dithering, and kicking the can down the road to follow that.

### Pharma

#### No impact – public funding solves and impact exaggerated

Kesselheim 16 – Aaron S. Kesselheim, Associate Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School and a faculty member in the Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics in the Department of Medicine at Brigham and Women’s Hospital, M.D. and J.D. from University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine and Law School, MPH from Harvard School of Public Health, primary care physician at the Phyllis Jen Center for Primary Care at Brigham & Women’s Hospital, Jerry Avorn, Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School and Chief of the Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics in the Department of Medicine at Brigham and Women’s Hospital, M.D. from Harvard Medical School in 1974, and completed a residency in internal medicine at the Beth Israel Hospital in Boston, Ameet Sarpatwari, PhD in epidemiology at the University of Cambridge, Instructor in Medicine at Harvard Medical School, an Associate Epidemiologist at Brigham and Women’s Hospital, and Assistant Director of the Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL) within the Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics, JD at the University of Maryland as a John L. Thomas Leadership Scholar, Principal Investigator on a Greenwall Foundation Making a Difference in Real-World Bioethics Dilemmas grant and a Faculty Affiliate with the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School and the Behavioral Insights Group at the Harvard Kennedy School (“The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins and Prospects for Reform,” *Journal of the American Medical Association*, Vol. 316, No. 8, pgs. 858–871, August 23rd, Available to Subscribing Institutions)

Justifications for High Drug Prices

The pharmaceutical industry has maintained that high drug prices reflect the research and development costs a company incurred to develop the drug, are necessary to pay for future research costs to develop new drugs, or both. It is true that industry often makes expensive investments in drug development and commercialization, particularly through late-stage clinical trials, which can be costly.84 These assertions have been used to justify high prices on the grounds that if drug prices are constrained, the pipeline of new medications will be adversely affected. Some economic analyses favored by the pharmaceutical industry contend that it costs $2.6 billion to develop a new drug that makes it to market.85 However, the rigor of this widely cited number has been disputed.86,87

A number of factors weigh against these rationales for high drug prices. First, important innovation that leads to new drug products is often performed in academic institutions and supported by investment from public sources such as the National Institutes of Health. A recent analysis of the most transformative drugs of the last 25 years found that more than half of the 26 products or product classes identified had their origins in publicly funded research in such nonprofit centers.88 Other analyses have highlighted the importance of small companies, many funded by venture capital.89,90 These biotech startups frequently take early-stage drug development research that may have its origins in academic laboratories and continue it until the product and the company can be acquired by a large manufacturer, as occurred with sofosbuvir.

Arguments in defense of maintaining high drug prices to protect the strength of the drug industry misstate its vulnerability. The biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors have for years been among the very best-performing sectors in the US economy. The proportion of revenue of large pharmaceutical companies that is invested in research and development is just 10% to 20% (Table 4); if only innovative product development is considered, that proportion is considerably lower.91 The contention that high prescription drug spending in the United States is required to spur domestic innovation has not been borne out in several analyses.92 A more relevant policy opportunity would be to address the stringency of congressional funding for the National Institutes of Health, such that its budget has barely kept up with inflation for most of the last decade. Given the evidence of the central role played by publicly funded research in generating discoveries that lead to new therapeutic approaches, this is one obvious area of potential intervention to address concerns about threats to innovation in drug discovery.

#### Pharma can’t solve disease

Young 14 [Jeffrey Young is a health care reporter at The Huffington Post based in Washington. He has covered health care, business, and politics for 15 years at organizations including Bloomberg News and The Hill 10-2-2014 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/02/ebola-cure\_n\_5915892.html]

That doesn't mean it's easy, even with all possible support from governments, pharmaceutical companies or anyone else. Inventing medicines and vaccines and diagnostic tests is difficult, takes time and is more likely to fail than succeed, Ross said. "It really takes almost a decade from concept to finally put the drug into a vial that you're ready to hand to a physician or a nurse," Ross said. "Very few drugs ever make it to market." Scientists must follow a basic set of procedures throughout that can take an unknown amount of time and pose challenges all along, any one of which could scuttle the entire enterprise, Ross said. It starts out with the basic, fundamental research of understanding what the disease is, how it works and how it might be counteracted. If those stages are successful and researchers have an idea of a way to attack the disease, they have to test it on animals to see whether it works at all, and whether it's safe. Before a treatment or vaccine can be tested on living humans, scientists must conduct two rounds of research on human cells and tissue, first for safety and then for effectiveness. If all of that is successful, a drug company then has to get approval from the Food and Drug Administration and regulators in other countries to sell the product, which can take years. During those painstaking steps, researchers and drugmakers always have to think about money. "It costs millions of dollars to do human trials," Ross said. "Even if you have a drug that is effective, it really sometimes comes down to the economics of it. If it's going to cost you way more than what a person can afford, they're not going to be able to manufacture it," Ross said. "There won't be a market for it."

Note: Internally citing Ted Ross, program director for vaccines and viral immunity at the Vaccine and Gene Therapy Institute of Florida in Port Saint Lucie.

## China Adv

#### Competition and R&D is high and growing --- but plan crushes innovation incentive

Atkinson & Ezell 21 --- Robert D. Atkinson, PhD, President Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, Atkinson serves on the UK government’s Place Advisory Group to advise the Minister for Science, Research and Innovation on how policy can drive innovation , Stephen Ezell is vice president, global innovation policy, at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), “Five Fatal Flaws in Rep. Katie Porter’s Indictment of the U.S. Drug Industry “, May 20, 2021, https://itif.org/publications/2021/05/20/five-fatal-flaws-rep-katie-porters-indictment-us-drug-industry

False Claim #2: Drug Companies Are Cutting R&D to Boost Profits for Shareholders

The report goes on to assert that drug companies have little incentive to invest in R&D and new drug development. This is an odd assertion given that in 2020, an estimated 66 drugs went off-patent and were available to be produced by generic companies.8 Without new drugs to replace those going off-patent, non-generic drug companies would soon be out of business.

Yet, the report argues, “Pharmaceutical companies have little incentive to invest in innovative new medicine without the threat of competition. Instead, they are free to devote their considerable resources to merging with or acquiring companies that might otherwise force them to compete.”9 As noted, competition has not materially diminished in the last 15 years; if anything, it has gotten more intense, with new biologics producers challenging traditional small molecule drug producers.

The report also cites a Roosevelt Institute report that states, “Yet, as prices have skyrocketed over the last few decades, these same companies’ investments in research and development have failed to match this same pace.”10 The report argues that “R&D has not matched price increases.” In reality, from 2012 to 2016, drug sales increased $5.8 billion a year, while R&D actually increased $6.8 billion a year.11

Drug companies in America are incredibly R&D intensive and have become even more so, with their R&D-to-sales ratio increasing from 11 percent in 2006 to 20 percent in 2018.12 The ratio for the top 20 U.S. companies increased from 15 percent in 2006 to 23.6 percent.13 Further, while drug revenues increased 56 percent from 2006 to 2018 (in nominal dollars), R&D increased by 85 percent.14

The report asserts that small firms invest more in R&D and that big firms use their revenue for other purposes, such as paying excessive CEO compensation. Actually, in 2016, the top 20 firms globally accounted for 66.5 percent of global sales yet made 64 percent of R&D investment.15 In 2018, the R&D intensity of the largest 4 firms was 26 percent, of the top 8 was 25 percent, and of the top 20 was 22 percent, with the entire industry at 20 percent.16 In reality, it is the largest firms, not the smallest, that are the most R&D intensive.

The Porter report complains that “the fraction of pharmaceutical sales revenue devoted to total R&D is generally under 20 percent.”17 Is 20 percent a lot, or a little? It turns out, a lot. The U.S biopharmaceutical industry is the world’s most R&D-intensive industry, with firms in the United States investing over 21 percent of sales in R&D, while accounting for 23 percent of total domestic R&D funded by U.S. businesses—more than any other sector.18 Over the last decade, biopharmaceutical companies in the United States have invested over half a trillion dollars in R&D, while more than 350 new medicines have been approved by the FDA.19 The industry reinvested 43.8 percent of value added (value sales minus purchased inputs) into research in 2014, more than any other industry in any country. (See figure 1.)

The Porter report asserts that “the share spent on the basic research that often generates truly innovative new compounds is estimated to be far smaller [than total R&D].” In fact, companies’ share of R&D classified as basic (14.3 percent) is higher than any other U.S. industry—and more than twice as high as the U.S. industry average (6.4 percent).20

Even though the U.S. industry invests more in R&D than any other industry in the world, the report implies that the industry is still too profitable. It cites a study that claims, “Pharma would still be the most profitable industry sector—even if it lost $1 trillion in sales,” implying that the industry could lose $1 trillion in sales a year through price controls and still be very profitable.22 This would be difficult, given global sales were around $1.3 trillion in 2019, and the top 10 pharma companies earned $392.5 billion.23

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But these figures are only for survivors, and do not include all the biopharma companies that went bankrupt because their discoveries did not pan out.28 In 2016, of the top 659 companies globally, only one-third (259) even made a profit.29

Moreover, even these modestly higher returns should not be cause for concern. As a study from the former Congressional Office of Technology Assessment finds, “Pharmaceutical R&D is a risky investment; therefore, high financial returns are necessary to induce companies to invest in researching new chemical entities.”30 Likewise, as Harvard economist Frederick M. Scherer wrote, “Had the returns to pharmaceutical R&D investment not been attractive, it seems implausible that drug-makers would have expanded their R&D so much more rapidly than their industrial peers.”31

Further, the report attacks the industry for engaging in stock buybacks, writing, “In 2018, the year that Donald Trump’s tax giveaway to the wealthy went into effect, 12 of the biggest pharmaceutical companies spent more money on stock buybacks than on research and development.”32 But stock buybacks were high that year because tax changes enabled companies to bring back repatriated profits from overseas to the United States, which is what many industries did. In fact, as one study notes, “In the United States, massive distributions of cash to shareholders are not unique to pharmaceutical companies.”33

The Porter report also argues that drug price controls would not [reduce] ~~retard~~ innovation because profits are so large. Not only are drug industry profits not excessive but most academic studies find that drug price controls will harm drug development.34 In large part, this is because, as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) noted, “There exists a high degree of correlation between pharmaceutical sales revenues and R&D expenditures.”35 In addition, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examined the potential impact of the proposed House legislation H.R.3, which among other provisions would require drug companies to negotiate lower prices with the government. It concluded that reducing manufacturers’ revenues by between $500 billion and $1 trillion over the next decade could result in 8 to 15 fewer new drugs coming to market.36

#### No China wars.

Thompson 17 – Timothy Heath, a senior international defense research analyst at the RAND Corporation. William R. Thompson, Political Science Professor at Indiana University. [U.S.-China Tensions Are Unlikely to Lead to War, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/05/us-china-tensions-are-unlikely-to-lead-to-war.html]

Graham Allison's April 12 article, “How America and China Could Stumble to War,” explores how misperceptions and bureaucratic dysfunction could accelerate a militarized crisis involving the United States and China into an unwanted war. However, the article fails to persuade because it neglects the key political and geostrategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Without those conditions in place, the risk that a crisis could accidentally escalate into war becomes far lower. The U.S.-China relationship today may be trending towards greater tension, but the relative stability and overall low level of hostility make the prospect of an accidental escalation to war extremely unlikely.

In a series of scenarios centered around the South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea, Allison explored how well-established flashpoints involving China and the United States and its allies could spiral into unwanted war. Allison’s article argues that given the context of strategic rivalry between a rising power and a status-quo power, organizational and bureaucratic misjudgments increase the likelihood of unintended escalation. According to Allison, “the underlying stress created by China’s disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict.” This argument appears persuasive on its surface, in no small part because it evokes insights from some of Allison’s groundbreaking work on the organizational pathologies that made the Cuban Missile Crisis so dangerous.

However, Allison ultimately fails to persuade because he fails to specify the political and strategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Allison’s analysis implies that the United States and China are in a situation analogous to that of the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1960s. In the Cold War example, the two countries faced each other on a near-war footing and engaged in a bitter geostrategic and ideological struggle for supremacy. The two countries experienced a series of militarized crises and fought each other repeatedly through proxy wars. It was this broader context that made issues of misjudgment so dangerous in a crisis.

By contrast, the U.S.-China relationship today operates at a much lower level of hostility and threat. China and the United States may be experiencing an increase in tensions, but the two countries remain far from the bitter, acrimonious rivalry that defined the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s. Neither Washington nor Beijing regards the other as its principal enemy. Today’s rivals may view each other warily as competitors and threats on some issues, but they also view each other as important trade partners and partners on some shared concerns, such as North Korea, as the recent summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese president Xi Jinping illustrated. The behavior of their respective militaries underscores the relatively restrained rivalry. The military competition between China and the United States may be growing, but it operates at a far lower level of intensity than the relentless arms racing that typified the U.S.-Soviet standoff. And unlike their Cold War counterparts, U.S. and Chinese militaries are not postured to fight each other in major wars. Moreover, polls show that the people of the two countries regard each other with mixed views—a considerable contrast from the hostile sentiment expressed by the U.S. and Soviet publics for each other. Lacking both preparations for major war and a constituency for conflict, leaders and bureaucracies in both countries have less incentive to misjudge crisis situations in favor of unwarranted escalation.

To the contrary, political leaders and bureaucracies currently face a strong incentive to find ways of defusing crises in a manner that avoids unwanted escalation. This inclination manifested itself in the EP-3 airplane collision off Hainan Island in 2001, and in subsequent incidents involving U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft, such as the harassment of the USNS Impeccable in 2009. This does not mean that there is no risk, however. Indeed, the potential for a dangerous militarized crisis may be growing. Moreover, key political and geostrategic developments could shift the incentives for leaders in favor of more escalatory options in a crisis and thereby make Allison’s scenarios more plausible. Past precedents offer some insight into the types of developments that would most likely propel the U.S.-China relationship into a hostile, competitive one featuring an elevated risk of conflict.

The most important driver, as Allison recognizes, would be a growing parity between China and the United States as economic, technological and geostrategic leaders of the international system. The United States and China feature an increasing parity in the size of their economies, but the United States retains a considerable lead in virtually every other dimension of national power. The current U.S.-China rivalry is a regional one centered on the Asia-Pacific region, but it retains the considerable potential of escalating into a global, systemic competition down the road. A second important driver would be the mobilization of public opinion behind the view that the other country is a primary source of threat, thereby providing a stronger constituency for escalatory policies. A related development would be the formal designation by leaders in both capitals of the other country as a primary hostile threat and likely foe. These developments would most likely be fueled by a growing array of intractable disputes, and further accelerated by a serious militarized crisis. The cumulative effect would be the exacerbation of an antagonistic competitive rivalry, repeated and volatile militarized crisis, and heightened risk that any flashpoint could escalate rapidly to war—a relationship that would resemble the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s.

Yet even if the relationship evolved towards a more hostile form of rivalry, unique features of the contemporary world suggest lessons drawn from the past may have limited applicability. Economic interdependence in the twenty-first century is much different and far more complex than in it was in the past. So is the lethality of weaponry available to the major powers. In the sixteenth century, armies fought with pikes, swords and primitive guns. In the twenty-first century, it is possible to eliminate all life on the planet in a full-bore nuclear exchange. These features likely affect the willingness of leaders to escalate in a crisis in a manner far differently than in past rivalries.

More broadly, Allison’s analysis about the “Thucydides Trap” may be criticized for exaggerating the risks of war. In his claims to identify a high propensity for war between “rising” and “ruling” countries, he fails to clarify those terms, and does not distinguish the more dangerous from the less volatile types of rivalries. Contests for supremacy over land regions, for example, have historically proven the most conflict-prone, while competition for supremacy over maritime regions has, by contrast, tended to be less lethal. Rivalries also wax and wane over time, with varying levels of risks of war. A more careful review of rivalries and their variety, duration and patterns of interaction suggests that although most wars involve rivalries, many rivals avoid going to war.

# 2NC

## Case

#### Pharma can’t solve disease

Young 14 [Jeffrey Young is a health care reporter at The Huffington Post based in Washington. He has covered health care, business, and politics for 15 years at organizations including Bloomberg News and The Hill 10-2-2014 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/02/ebola-cure\_n\_5915892.html]

That doesn't mean it's easy, even with all possible support from governments, pharmaceutical companies or anyone else. Inventing medicines and vaccines and diagnostic tests is difficult, takes time and is more likely to fail than succeed, Ross said. "It really takes almost a decade from concept to finally put the drug into a vial that you're ready to hand to a physician or a nurse," Ross said. "Very few drugs ever make it to market." Scientists must follow a basic set of procedures throughout that can take an unknown amount of time and pose challenges all along, any one of which could scuttle the entire enterprise, Ross said. It starts out with the basic, fundamental research of understanding what the disease is, how it works and how it might be counteracted. If those stages are successful and researchers have an idea of a way to attack the disease, they have to test it on animals to see whether it works at all, and whether it's safe. Before a treatment or vaccine can be tested on living humans, scientists must conduct two rounds of research on human cells and tissue, first for safety and then for effectiveness. If all of that is successful, a drug company then has to get approval from the Food and Drug Administration and regulators in other countries to sell the product, which can take years. During those painstaking steps, researchers and drugmakers always have to think about money. "It costs millions of dollars to do human trials," Ross said. "Even if you have a drug that is effective, it really sometimes comes down to the economics of it. If it's going to cost you way more than what a person can afford, they're not going to be able to manufacture it," Ross said. "There won't be a market for it."

Note: Internally citing Ted Ross, program director for vaccines and viral immunity at the Vaccine and Gene Therapy Institute of Florida in Port Saint Lucie.

## China Adv

#### Competition and R&D is high and growing --- but plan crushes innovation incentive

Atkinson & Ezell 21 --- Robert D. Atkinson, PhD, President Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, Atkinson serves on the UK government’s Place Advisory Group to advise the Minister for Science, Research and Innovation on how policy can drive innovation , Stephen Ezell is vice president, global innovation policy, at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), “Five Fatal Flaws in Rep. Katie Porter’s Indictment of the U.S. Drug Industry “, May 20, 2021, https://itif.org/publications/2021/05/20/five-fatal-flaws-rep-katie-porters-indictment-us-drug-industry

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However, Allison ultimately fails to persuade because he fails to specify the political and strategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Allison’s analysis implies that the United States and China are in a situation analogous to that of the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1960s. In the Cold War example, the two countries faced each other on a near-war footing and engaged in a bitter geostrategic and ideological struggle for supremacy. The two countries experienced a series of militarized crises and fought each other repeatedly through proxy wars. It was this broader context that made issues of misjudgment so dangerous in a crisis.

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## FTC CP

### OV – 2NC-1NR

#### At the top -

#### Our internal net benefit is *perception of FTC independence*.

#### The CPlan *boosts it* because the FTC’s the lone actor. Plan and perm *don’t solve* - they involve *non-FTC actors*.

#### Our Nam cards are shockingly strong. The global community models FTC independence levels. External actors might be good or bad domestically, but – overseas - they greenlight involvement of political appointees. That boosts mercantilist postures and crushes global free trade.

#### Free trade turns case – it checks ongoing global wars which structurally complicate the Aff advantages AND detract resources for Aff enforcement.

#### Our ev lists six extinction warrants – we’ll deepen the terminals:

#### ( ) geoengineering overcompensates – fails and causes extinction.

#### Baum ‘13

Et al; Dr. Seth Baum is an American researcher involved in the field of risk research. He is the executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI), a think tank focused on existential risk. He is also affiliated with the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science and the Columbia University Center for Research on Environmental Decisions. He holds a PhD in Geography and authored his dissertation on climate change policy: “Double catastrophe: intermittent stratospheric geoengineering induced by societal collapse” - Source: Environment Systems & Decisions - vol.33, no.1 pp. 168-180 - #E&F – available via: https://pubag.nal.usda.gov/catalog/122717

Perceived failure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions has prompted interest in avoiding the harms of climate change via geoengineering, that is, the intentional manipulation of Earth system processes. Perhaps the most promising geoengineering technique is stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), which reflects incoming solar radiation, thereby lowering surface temperatures. This paper analyzes a scenario in which SAI brings great harm on its own. The scenario is based on the issue of SAI intermittency, in which aerosol injection is halted, sending temperatures rapidly back toward where they would have been without SAI. The rapid temperature increase could be quite damaging, which in turn creates a strong incentive to avoid intermittency. In the scenario, a catastrophic societal collapse eliminates society’s ability to continue SAI, despite the incentive. The collapse could be caused by a pandemic, nuclear war, or other global catastrophe. The ensuing intermittency hits a population that is already vulnerable from the initial collapse, making for a double catastrophe. While the outcomes of the double catastrophe are difficult to predict, plausible worst-case scenarios include human extinction. The decision to implement SAI is found to depend on whether global catastrophe is more likely from double catastrophe or from climate change alone. The SAI double catastrophe scenario also strengthens arguments for greenhouse gas emissions reductions and against SAI, as well as for building communities that could be self-sufficient during global catastrophes. Finally, the paper demonstrates the value of integrative, systems-based global catastrophic risk analysis.

#### ( ) *Prolif* and *climate* each independently cause extinction

* Climate change is true and real bad
* Prolif = probable scenario for extinction bc of *miscalc*, *user error*, or *unauthorized use*.

Thakur ‘15

Ramesh Thakur, Director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University. 2015. “Nuclear Weapons and International Security.” Routledge

The world faces two existential threats: climate change and nuclear Armageddon. Those who reject the first are derided as denialists; those dismissive of the second are praised as realists. Nuclear weapons may or may not have kept the peace among various groups of rival states; they could be catastrophic for the world if ever used by both sides in a war between nuclear-armed rivals; and the prospects for their use have grown since the end of the Cold War. Even a limited regional nuclear war in which India and Pakistan used 50 Hiroshima-size (15kt) bombs each could lead to a famine that kills up to a billion people. 1 Having learnt to live with nuclear weapons for 70 years (1945–2015), we have become desensitized to the gravity and immediacy of the threat. The tyranny of complacency could yet exact a fearful price with nuclear Armageddon. The nuclear peace has held so far owing as much to good luck as sound stewardship. Deterrence stability depends on rational decision-makers being always in office on all sides: a dubious and not very. reassuring precondition It depends equally critically on there being no rogue launch, human error or system malfunction: an impossibly high bar. For nuclear peace to hold, deterrence and fail-safe mechanisms must work every single time. For nuclear Armageddon, deterrence or fail-safe mechanisms need to break down only once. This is not a comforting equation. It also explains why, unlike most situations where risk can be mitigated after disaster strikes, with nuclear weapons all risks must be mitigated before any disaster. 2 As more states acquire nuclear weapons, the risks multiply exponentially with the requirements for rationality in all decision-makers; robust command-and-control systems in all states; 100 percent reliable fail-safe mechanisms and procedures against accidental and unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons; and totally unbreachable security measures against terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons by being able to penetrate one or more of the growing nuclear facilities or access some of the wider spread of nuclear material and technology.

#### ( ) Arctic war means extinction

#### outweighs on probability and magnitude – war exits the region, goes nuclear, and can be instigated by miscalc.

Chrisinger ‘20

Internally quoting Niklas Granholm – who is Deputy Director of Studies at FOI, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, Division for Defence Analysis. Mr Granholm currently heads a study project on behalf of the Swedish Foreign Ministry studying the strategic developments in the Arctic. He was seconded to the Swedish Ministry of Defence in 2007 and during 2006 was a Visiting Fellow to RUSI. He has been an Associate Fellow of the Institute since 2007. Between 1999-2006, he headed the project for international peace support and crisis management operations on behalf of the Swedish Ministry of Defence. From 1997-99 he was seconded to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Division for European Security Policy. David Chrisinger is a Logan Nonfiction Fellow and a contributing writer to The New York Times Magazine and The War Horse, an award-winning nonprofit newsroom educating the public on military service, war, and its impact. Prior to this, David worked at the U.S. Government Accountability Office as a Strategic Planning and Foresight Analyst. For nearly nine years, he taught public policy writing, consulted with researchers on the design and execution of governmental audits and evaluations, facilitated message development exercises, and wrote and edited reports and testimonies for the U.S. Congress. For six years, he also taught public policy writing at Johns Hopkins University. “It Would Be a Mistake to Underestimate Russia”: The New Cold War That’s Emerging in the Arctic” – The War Horse – Nov 19th - #E&F - https://thewarhorse.org/military-arctic-new-cold-war-with-russia-and-climate-change/

One of the greatest risks, according to Niklas Granholm, is that the Arctic region will undergo a “Balkanization” like what occurred in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union. Granholm is the deputy director of studies at the Swedish Defence Research Agency, and he points to the Faroe Islands calling for self-rule from Denmark, Scotland clamoring for independence from the United Kingdom after Brexit, and the resurgence of troubles in Northern Ireland as indicators that more fragmentation and political division in the Arctic could lead to less cooperation or even hostility. Paired with the great-power competition among the United States, Russia, and China, any Balkanization of the region would, in Granholm’s words, be a “double whammy” and could make the Arctic much more combustible.

“Whatever happens in the Arctic won’t stay there,” he said. “It will escalate.”

Is this the beginning of a new Cold War?

The new Norwegian radar system undermines Russia’s ability to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike from its submarine fleet in the Arctic, New York Times reported, and that bothers Russia, according to Lt. Col. Tormod Heier, a faculty adviser at the Norwegian Defense University College. Because it upsets the strategic nuclear balance between the United States and Russia, the new radar system establishes a blow to Russia’s last indisputable claim to great-power status.

“There is a new Cold War,” Heier told the Times, adding that the risk of nuclear war was much higher now than in the old Cold War “because Russia is so much weaker, and because of that much more dangerous and unpredictable.”

In recognition of the threats posed by a new Cold War, the Pentagon released an updated National Defense Strategy in January 2018. While the document makes no specific mention of the Arctic, it recognizes the threats posed by great-power competition (especially as it relates to America’s eroding competitive edge) and clarifies that potential conflict with Russia and China had supplanted terrorism as the biggest threat to American national security.

To achieve this end state, the United States must confront three risks that, if they materialized, would stand in the way. First, bad actors could use the Arctic as a staging ground for an attack on the U.S. homeland. Second, states like Russia and China could challenge the rules-based international order in the Arctic in ways that could lead to conflict. Third, but not least, tensions, competition, and conflict in other parts of the world could spill over into the Arctic.

Three months later, the U.S. Coast Guard released its own strategy for the Arctic, which called for funding to upgrade ships, aircraft, and unmanned systems operating in the region. Admiral Karl Schultz, the Coast Guard’s commandant, told the Washington Post that the goal should be to return the Arctic to a “peaceful place where we work to cross international lines here with partner nations that share interests in a transparent fashion.” Projecting sovereignty, he continued, will help expedite that return.

But all these plans have failed to persuade decision makers to establish new organizational structures designed to address changes in the Arctic wrought by climate change and the rush to exploit the region’s natural resources. The plans do not include any substantive plans to guide the construction of infrastructure needed in the region, nor do they detail how resources will need to be reallocated to mitigate risks and help the United States reach its desired end state. They provide a vision for the future, but they do not provide a road map on how to get there.

Russia won’t back down

In late August 2019, a Russian submarine emerged from the icy waters near the North Pole and fired a Sineva-type intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. That same day, another Russian submarine in the Arctic Circle launched a Bulava-type intercontinental ballistic missile from beneath the surface of the Barents Sea. One missile hit a remote corner of Russia’s Pacific coast, and the other landed on the Kanin Peninsula. Twelve years after Russia planted its flag on the seabed below the North Pole, this demonstration of its military capabilities in the Arctic can be seen as its latest attempt to assert its sovereignty in the region. Against a broader backdrop of distrust and diminished communication across the U.S.-Russia divide, there exists a risk that relatively minor miscalculations or misinterpretations could escalate into broader conflict.

#### ( ) Space conflict causes extinction

* creates “use it or lose it” pressures bc an attack on a satellite creates communication and (subsequently) warfighting vulnerabilities;
* outweighs on probability

Marshall ‘21

Timothy John Marshall is a British journalist, author and broadcaster, specialising in foreign affairs and international diplomacy. He is a guest commentator on world events for the BBC. Marshall's blog, 'Foreign Matters', was short-listed for the Orwell Prize 2010.[8] In 2004 he was a finalist in the Royal Television Society's News Event category for his Iraq War coverage. He won finalist certificates in 2007, for a report on the Mujahideen, and in 2004 for his documentary 'The Desert Kingdom' which featured exclusive access to Crown Prince Abdullah and his palaces. “War in space is a growing threat – with hypersonic missiles and lasers to shoot down satellites” - This is an edited excerpt from the book: The Power of Geography: Ten Maps That Reveal the Future of Our World by Tim Marshall - April 20, 2021 - #E&F – modified for language that may offend - https://inews.co.uk/news/long-reads/space-war-lasers-missiles-satellites-conflict-tim-marshall-963439

Without binding treaties, low Earth orbit is a probable battlefield for military weapons aimed firstly at rivals within the belt, and then below it.

Russia and China have made organisational changes in their military, as have the Americans with the formation of the US Space Force in 2019. There are concerns that this activity violates the Outer Space Treaty, but it only states that weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear missiles should not be placed “in orbit or on celestial bodies or [stationed] in outer space in any other manner”. There’s nothing in international law to prevent the stationing of laser-armed satellites. And every page of history suggests that if one country does it, so will another, and then another. This is why the US Department of Defence has a mantra: “Space is a war-fighting domain.”

Britain’s space force

The UK Space Command was officially formed on 1 April, staffed from the Royal Navy (RN), British Army and Royal Air Force (RAF), the Civil Service and key members of the commercial sector. Its commander is a former Harrier jump jet pilot, Air Vice-Marshal Paul Godfrey.

The defence think-tank Rusi said after the British announcement that “questions remain as to what a space command means in practice, particularly for a medium-sized space power with few sovereign assets”. It added that “major decisions shaping the future of the UK’s military space capabilities and activities are likely to be taken this year”.

The head of the RAF, Air Chief Marshal Sir Mike Wigston, warned in November that Russia and China were developing anti-satellite weaponry and that the UK must be prepared.

“A future conflict may not start in space, but I am in no doubt it will transition very quickly to space, and it may even be won or lost in space, so we have to be ready and, if necessary, defend our critical national interests.”

In the previous century the possibility of nuclear war threatened to destroy our way of life; now the weaponisation of space ~~looks~~ (seems) as if it will pose a similar danger.

At the inauguration of Space Force, the then US President Donald Trump said: “American superiority in space is absolutely vital… The Space Force will help us deter aggression and control the ultimate high ground.”

The Chinese and Russians view space in the same way. We saw an early attempt to gain this advantage with the American Strategic Defence Initiative in the 80s, trying to develop a missile-defence system that could protect the US from nuclear attack. One of the options it investigated was space-based weaponry, earning it the name “Star Wars”.

Now the development of hypersonic missiles, which can fly at more than 20 times the speed of sound, is also focusing attention on this area. Unlike conventional intercontinental ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles do not fly in an arc and can change direction and altitude. Therefore, at launch the potentially targeted country cannot work out where they are heading and co-ordinate their defences. Hitting a missile with a missile is hard enough; hypersonic missiles make it much more difficult.

Governments are examining the possibility of positioning anti-hypersonic laser systems in space to fire downwards. But machines capable of firing on the laser systems would then be developed, and then defensive systems for them – a space arms race.

The situation will only become more complicated as we continue to turn science fiction into reality. An example of that came in July 2020. Russia’s Kosmos 2542 military satellite had been “stalking” an American satellite, USA 245, at times coming within 150km of it, a distance regarded as close. It then released a mini satellite from within it – Kosmos 2543. The US military calls these “Russian dolls”. This “baby” Kosmos also shadowed the American spacecraft before manoeuvring towards a third Russian satellite. It then appeared to fire a projectile travelling at more than 400mph.

The Kremlin says it was simply inspecting the condition of its satellites, but the British and Americans both believe it was a weapons test. The US also shadows foreign satellites and is researching its own space weapons, but it was furious about what it believes was a breach of conventional behaviour. Such protocols and understandings are not codified in ratified law. But the threat to satellites is one that all countries must take seriously.

Dangers in orbit

Satellites are vital for modern warfare. All advanced countries rely on satellites for intelligence and surveillance. If a series of military satellites were hit, the high command would immediately worry that this was a precursor to being attacked on the ground. Early-warning systems of a nuclear launch might go down, triggering a decision on whether to launch first. Even if a conflict remained non-nuclear, the other side would have the advantage of precision-targeting its enemy and moving its own forces without being “seen”, while its opponent’s ability to send encrypted communications would also be limited.

This is all a very real threat. Already Russia, China, the US, India and Israel have developed “satellite-killer” systems. Techniques are being invented to shoot down satellites with lasers, to “dazzle” them so they cannot communicate, to spray them with chemicals, and even to ram them. And with no laws about who can be where, how close they can be and what activity is allowed, there is the growing danger of an exercise, or even faulty navigating, being mistaken for an impending attack.

#### Our internationalism module

#### 1NC Nam gave a separate internal link – when other nations are commitment to a model that support agency independence in Antitrust regulation It checks rivalry spirals that hampers support for global Internationalism *outside of free trade*.

#### That’s key to check extinction from AI, climate, and security risks.

Jain ‘19

et al; Ash Jain is a Senior Fellow and coordinates the Atlantic Council’s Democratic Order Initiative and D10 Strategy Forum. He previously served as a member of the Secretary of State’s policy-planning staff, focusing on US alliances and partnerships, international norms, and challenges to the democratic order—including those posed by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Mr. Jain has also taught as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He earned a JD/MS in foreign service from Georgetown University – “Present at the Re-Creation: A Global Strategy for Revitalizing, Adapting, and Defending a Rules-Based International System” - Atlantic Council Strategy Papers – October - #E&F - https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Present-at-the-Recreation.pdf

This international system, while not perfect, has proven to be more successful than any in human history at providing security, economic prosperity, and freedom. The evidence of this is apparent in the numbers. Before 1945, major powers frequently engaged in direct warfare on a massive scale, as in the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II. Since 1945, however, there have been zero great-power wars. As shown in Figure 1, the percentage of people killed in armed conflict has drastically declined in the post-World War II era. Armed conflict killed an average of 1–2 percent of the human population from 1600 to 1945. During the Cold War, an average of 0.4 percent of the world’s population perished due to war. Since the year 2000, less than one one-hundredth of 1 percent of people have died this way.8 Under a rules-based system, the world has continued to make progress in reducing deaths from all kinds of war, including often-intractable civil conflicts.9

Turning to economic prosperity, the global gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 1945 was $4,079.10 Today it is $11,570.11 This drastic increase in global living standards is evident in Figure 2. The share of the global population living in poverty has dramatically decreased. In 1929, the number of people living in extreme poverty (defined as earning less than 1.90 international dollars per day) was 1.35 billion, almost two-thirds of the world population at the time. In 2015, that figure was 733.48 million, or slightly less than 10 percent of the world population.12 China itself has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of this system, as geopolitical stability in Asia and integration into the global economy helped to lift four hundred million Chinese out of poverty.

In the realm of good governance, the number of democracies has substantially increased. With the end of World War II and decolonization, the number of democracies increased from seventeen to forty-eight between 1945 and 1989.13 That number further skyrocketed at the end of the Cold War, as countries formerly behind the Iron Curtain rushed to join the West. In the year 1900, there were twelve democracies in the world. Today there are ninety-six.14 The percentage of the world’s population living under democratic governments has also increased from about 12 percent in 1900 to more than 55 percent today.15 This trend is visible in Figure 3.

To be sure, these outcomes are the result of an enormous and interconnected range of factors. International-relations scholars, for example, believe that nuclear deterrence and the absence of a multipolar distribution of power also contributed to great-power peace.16 In addition, globalization and economic development have been fueled by new technological developments. Further, global norms on democratic governance and human rights have come a long way since the early twentieth century.17

Still, it is doubtful whether this dramatic improvement in the human condition could have been achieved in the absence of the rules-based international system. Moreover, many of these other driving forces are themselves constitutive of, if not partially the result of, that system. Global bipolarity, and then unipolarity with the United States at its center, was critical for the postwar development of a rules-based system, which may not have been possible in a more multipolar distribution of international power, or with a non-democratic hegemon at the system’s apex. The splitting of the atom could have resulted in widespread nuclear-weapons proliferation and nuclear use had it not been for the NPT and extended US nuclear deterrence in Europe and Asia.18 The most important technological advances for globalization, including the Internet, occurred and flourished in the free world, defended by the United States and its democratic allies and partners.19 Finally, the United States and its democratic partners, along with nongovernmental organizations and individuals operating in these states, were the most important norm entrepreneurs propagating global norms around issues of good governance, democracy, and human rights.

In sum, the rules-based international system that has been the defining feature of global order for the past seventy years has coincided with—and was almost certainly essential in bringing about—the most secure, prosperous, and well-governed world humanity has ever known.

Despite this record of unprecedented and enduring success, the rules-based international system is currently besieged by a number of challenges unleashed by rapid and dramatic global change. Understanding the current strategic context, including global trends and threats both external and internal to the system’s democratic core, is a necessary first step toward devising a strategy to revitalize, adapt, and defend a rules-based international system.

Global Diffusion of Power. The international distribution of power, as defined by relative economic weight, is shifting away from the founders of the post-World War II system to other emerging economies. As recently as the 1990s, nearly 70 percent of global economic activity occurred in Europe and the Americas. By the 2040s, that number is expected to drop to roughly 40 percent. At the same time, the Asian share of global GDP will increase from 32 percent at present to 53 percent in 2050, meaning that, by that time, the majority of all economic activity on Earth will occur in Asia.

While the United States remains the world’s most powerful state militarily and economically, it is declining relative to other rising powers, particularly China. When corrected for purchasing-power parity (PPP), China’s GDP has already surpassed the United States. The better metric for international power and influence, however, is real GDP; here, too, the US advantage is narrowing, but more slowly.21 At the conclusion of World War II, the United States possessed roughly 50 percent of global GDP.22 From the 1970s through today, that number has held steady at roughly 25 percent.23 Despite a common misperception, the United States’ share of global power is not declining in absolute terms.

Rather, other powers—especially China—are rising. China’s share of global GDP rose from 4.6 percent in the 1990s to 15 percent today.24 Many economists predict that China could surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy by 2030. It is noteworthy, however, that in 2009, economists predicted that this transition would happen by 2020. That date has been pushed back a decade as Chinese growth has slowed. Future projections depend entirely on assumptions about growth rates in the United States and China that cannot be known with certainty. Still, most economists expect that China will, at some point, surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy.

China is joined by other emerging economies with rapid growth rates, including India, Indonesia, and others. US allies, including Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom, remain among the wealthiest nations on Earth, but their share of global power is also declining relative to the rise of the rest.

This shift is significant because international orders function best when their formal attributes at least roughly reflect the underlying balance of power. While only one measure of global influence, economic power is central given the leverage it provides over trade and investment, and the resources it offers to sustain military and security advantages.

It is also important to point out, however, that the United States and its formal treaty allies continue to possess a preponderance of power in the international system. As Figure 4 shows, the United States and its formal allies currently produce 59 percent of global GDP. When including other countries considered to be “democracies” by the widely used Polity scores, that number rises to 75 percent of global GDP. Democracies continue to retain global influence because more countries have transitioned to democracy since the end of the Cold War, and overall economic growth in democratic countries has outpaced that in autocratic states since 1991.

The major shift since the dawn of the post-Cold War world, therefore, is not that the power of the United States and its democratic allies and partners has declined substantially. The major difference is that the share possessed by autocratic challengers, especially China, has grown. As Figure 4 shows, the world is approaching a more bipolar distribution of power, with more wealth concentrated in the democracies and in a grouping of autocratic challengers led by China.

This means that, if they are able to work together more cohesively, the United States and its democratic allies and partners still have the power and influence necessary to significantly shape international outcomes. Moreover, if they are able to expand their ranks to court other nonaligned democracies like India, Indonesia, and Mexico, their influence on the international system can be even more decisive.

Disruptive Technologies. New technologies—including artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, quantum computing, and biotech, among others—are being developed at an exponential pace, and have the promise to transform society. They will determine how people live and function in the twenty-first century, significantly shaping the global economy, international security, and the course of geopolitics.

Throughout history, progress has been built on technological innovation, ranging from Thomas Edison’s light bulb to Henry Ford’s assembly line to the silicon chip, the personal computer, and the Internet. While new technology promises improved productivity and quality of life, it will bring serious downside risks, including economic dislocation and weapons proliferation. AI, for example, is already being widely adopted in the private sector to achieve great efficiencies and cost savings.25 At the same time, automation threatens to put millions out of work as jobs once performed by humans are replaced by machines. Moreover, AI is also being introduced into national militaries. A logical next step is fully autonomous weapons that can select and engage targets without a human in the decision-making loop. Some warn that these “killer robots” introduce many ethical and security risks, including the fear that they may turn on their creators and threaten humans’ very existence or, indeed, what it means to be human.26 Henry Kissinger warns, “We are in danger of losing the capacity that has been the essence of human cognition.”27

The existing international system was designed to deal with the most important dual-use technologies of the twentieth century, such as nuclear power, but it must be updated to deal with the technologies of the twenty-first century. As with nuclear energy, the international community needs an entirely new set of international norms, standards, and agreements for responsible uses of new technologies that mitigate their downside risks, while maximizing their upside potential.

Since the time of Edison, the United States has been the world’s most innovative country, but it is at risk of losing that title to China and other countries that aim for the first-mover advantage in the next round of technological breakthroughs. Throughout history, technological progress and international leadership have gone hand in hand. Think of roads and aqueducts in ancient Rome, the steam engine in nineteenth-century Great Britain, and the Internet in the United States. If China or another country takes the lead in the new tech arms race, Beijing may be in a better position to rewrite the international system’s rules.

Nuclear Proliferation. Even as the world grapples with the technological challenges of the twenty-first century, century-old technological challenges remain. The NPT may be the most successful treaty in history, but its future is uncertain. North Korea has become the only country in history to sign the treaty, withdraw, and build nuclear weapons. If North Korea is allowed to become an accepted nuclear-weapons state, it would pose a severe threat to international peace and security. Other members of the treaty may also reconsider their nuclear options. In particular, South Korea and Japan may be at risk of pursuing nuclear-weapons programs if the program in Pyongyang continues to advance and the United States is unwilling or unable to provide Seoul and Tokyo with adequate security assurances.

Iran’s nuclear program was allowed to operate within strict limits according to the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but the US withdrawal from that agreement may lead Tehran to accelerate its nuclear program or dash to achieve a nuclear weapon. A bomb in Iran could also instigate further regional nuclear proliferation.28 Officials in Saudi Arabia, for example, have declared that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Riyadh will follow suit.

A proliferation cascade in East Asia or the Middle East would undermine the global nonproliferation regime and fuel regional insecurity. Moreover, new technologies such as additive manufacturing may make it easier for future proliferators to build nuclear-weapons programs, and harder for the international community to catch and stop them.29

The additional spread of a weapon that remains the ultimate instrument of military force could threaten the global security and stability necessary for the smooth functioning of the rules-based international system.

Ecological Disaster. As with nuclear war, an ecological disaster could constitute a direct threat to humanity’s very existence. While states have made efforts to address climate change caused by carbon emissions, including in the Paris Climate Agreement, these steps will not be sufficient to keep emissions below the target levels set by leading scientific panels. Higher average global temperatures are leading to rising sea levels, drought, an increased frequency of violent storms, and forced migrations, all of which are threatening vulnerable societies, undermining already-weak national governments, and contributing to conflicts over natural resources.

#### Section 5 affords great latitude for FTC discretion.

Dagen ‘10

Richard – Formerly, Adjunct Professor Boston University School of Law (Aug 2005 - Dec 2006) specializing in Antitrust; former Kramer Fellow - Harvard Law School. At the time of this writing, the author served as Antitrust, High Tech and Antitrust Special Counsel to the Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission “RAMBUS, INNOVATION EFFICIENCY, AND SECTION 5 OF THE FTC ACT” – BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW - Vol. 90 - #E&F - http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/bulr/documents/dagen.pdf

The Sherman Act was enacted over one hundred years ago to prevent conduct likely to harm consumers.14 Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes unreasonable agreements between competitors, such as naked price fixing.15 Section 2 addresses exclusionary conduct by single firms, making it unlawful to “monopolize or attempt to monopolize” a market for goods or services in the United States.16 The Sherman Act is enforced by federal and state authorities, as well as through private rights of action. Successful plaintiffs are entitled to treble damages under the Sherman Act. The FTC, created in 1914, enforces the antitrust laws through Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of competition.”17 As discussed at length below, Section 5 also “empower[s] the Commission to define and proscribe an unfair competitive practice, *even though* the practice does not infringe either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws.”18

#### FTC recently expanded authority. That renders Aff disads to the CPlan are not unique – but it doesn’t complicate our internal net benefits.

Roach ‘21

Lee Roach – Partner with Faegre, Drinker, Biddle & Reath LLP. Holds a J.D. (cum laude), Notre Dame Law School – “The FTC Expands Section 5 Enforcement Efforts With Potentially Broad Implications” – JD Supra – July 12th, 2021 - #E&F - https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-ftc-expands-section-5-enforcement-7020931/

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently updated its interpretation of its authority to challenge “unfair methods of competition” under Section 5 of the FTC Act. It will no longer limit enforcement actions under Section 5 to conduct that violates the consumer welfare standard. This may significantly expand the sorts of business activities the FTC investigates and challenges.

Although this adjustment, in conjunction with other recent developments at the FTC, is widely interpreted to signal increased scrutiny of Big Tech companies, the FTC’s pivot on its Section 5 authority may have broader implications. Companies should monitor the FTC’s next steps closely for further insights on conduct it may challenge in the future.

On July 1, the FTC voted to expand its enforcement efforts under Section 5 of the FTC Act. Section 5 authorizes the FTC to investigate and challenge “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce” (15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)) — language that is seemingly open-ended. Courts have not precisely defined the outer-bounds of the FTC’s Section 5 authority.

Previously, according to a 2015 policy statement, the FTC was “guided by” the consumer welfare standard when using its Section 5 authority, and focused on whether the conduct in question artificially raised prices. This hewed closely to how courts have interpreted the other main federal antitrust statutes, the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. In fact, in that same 2015 policy statement the FTC clarified that it would be “less likely to challenge an act or practice as an unfair method of competition on a standalone basis if enforcement of the Sherman Act or Clayton Act is sufficient to address the competitive harm arising from the act or practice.” And even where the Sherman Act or Clayton Act may not have prohibited certain conduct, the FTC’s record of enforcement has tended to focus on “incipient” conduct that could in the future lead to clear violations of those statutes, such as invitations to collude or exchanges of competitively sensitive information.

The FTC’s move on July 1 constitutes a meaningful departure from its prior interpretation of Section 5, and signals that the FTC may now interpret “unfair methods of competition” more expansively than in the past. Indeed, in a statement released in conjunction with the move, new FTC Chair Lina Khan stated that the 2015 policy statement “contravene[d] the text, structure, and history of Section 5 and largely wr[ote] the FTC’s standalone authority out of existence.” The move also harkens to previous advocacy by Chair Khan that the consumer welfare standard is an inadequate tool for challenging Big Tech companies.

Importantly, however, nothing limits the FTC’s newly expansive understanding of its Section 5 authority only to Big Tech companies. In fact, prior statements by those commissioners who voted with Chair Khan to expand the FTC’s authority under Section 5 seem to indicate just the opposite. To take but one example, two years ago FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra released a statement, joined by fellow Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, criticizing an FTC settlement with online cosmetics company Sunday Riley Modern Skincare LLC. The company had posted false reviews of its products online in order to drive traffic. Commissioner Chopra argued this “false advertising [was] an unfair method of competition,” and thereby criticized the FTC’s action for failing to address the conduct as an antitrust violation and not simply a consumer protection violation.

The FTC’s vote on July 1 opens the door to such an approach in future cases. All companies – not just Big Tech companies – will have to watch the FTC’s next steps carefully and determine how they might affect their own legal and business strategies. It will also be important to monitor how courts may respond to future challenges the FTC brings under its Section 5 authority, as courts may not necessarily agree with the FTC’s newly expansive view.

#### CPlan solves Big Tech Affs

Rozga ‘21

et al; Kaj Rozga is a former Federal Trade Commission attorney with a breadth of antitrust experience representing clients in litigation, cartel, and transactional matters. While with the FTC's Bureau of Competition, Kaj was a member of trial teams that brought a pair of successful hospital merger challenges and was involved in the review of various healthcare, consumer products, and technology deals. He is now an attorney in the private sector. “Major Leadership and Policy Changes at the FTC—What They Mean for Antitrust and Consumer Protection Enforcement in Technology Markets” – Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP - 07.14.21 - #E&F - https://www.dwt.com/insights/2021/07/biden-ftc-antitrust-initiatives

The recent developments at the FTC reflect an antitrust and consumer protection regulatory landscape that is very much in flux, with technology markets, in particular, in the cross hairs. Companies should expect to encounter a more aggressive FTC that opens a larger volume of investigations, brings more borderline cases, and wields its rulemaking authority more broadly.

For large technology incumbents, these developments suggest meaningfully more regulatory and legal risk, in particular as these companies expand into new markets either through internal product development or by acquisition.

What constitutes "unfair methods of competition" under Section 5, for example, could be open to quite broad interpretation. At a minimum, it should be expected that the FTC will push for more aggressive enforcement to protect of rivals, trading partners, buyers, and employees, even where customers or consumers are not being harmed.

More aggressive merger enforcement in technology markets will likely single out acquisitions of nascent or potential rivals. It seems plausible that the agency will also more frequently rely on novel theories of competitive harm, such as those involving purported vertical or conglomerate effects that an acquisition may have on the wider ecosystem in which a technology company operates.

### Solves for “Innovation” criteria Affs

#### Cplan solves – Section 5 can expand to criteria centered on innovation.

Rozga ‘21

et al; Kaj Rozga is a former Federal Trade Commission attorney with a breadth of antitrust experience representing clients in litigation, cartel, and transactional matters. While with the FTC's Bureau of Competition, Kaj was a member of trial teams that brought a pair of successful hospital merger challenges and was involved in the review of various healthcare, consumer products, and technology deals. He is now an attorney in the private sector. “Major Leadership and Policy Changes at the FTC—What They Mean for Antitrust and Consumer Protection Enforcement in Technology Markets” – Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP - 07.14.21 - #E&F – modified for language that may offend - https://www.dwt.com/insights/2021/07/biden-ftc-antitrust-initiatives

The Commission also voted to rescind a 2015 policy statement setting out the contours for the agency's reliance on Section 5 of the FTC Act, which bars "unfair methods of competition." Section 5 has been at the center of much controversy. Its critics say the use of Section 5 "unfair competition" claims should be constrained in order to avoid overbroad and arbitrary enforcement by the FTC.

Its proponents in academic and policy circles, on the other hand, argue that Congress intended an expansive use of the provision that would reach conduct that has proven difficult for enforcers when relying on traditional antitrust laws—the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act—such as invitations to collude, so-called "pay-for-delay" pharmaceutical deals, exclusive dealing, and employee non-competes.6

The 2015 policy statement signaled that the FTC had conceded to a more restrictive view of Section 5. It declared the "consumer welfare standard" the predominant rubric for adjudging whether competition has been harmed in Section 5 cases; promoted the use of a "rule of reason" balancing test for proving competitive effects; and backed off relying on standalone Section 5 claims where enforcement of traditional antitrust laws would suffice.7

These positions have been targeted by reformers, who ~~viewed~~ (considered) them as barriers to broader enforcement of competition laws. The July 1, 2021, decision by the FTC to rescind the 2015 policy statement could signal an expansion of agency powers to target novel claims under Section 5:

For antitrust reformers, going beyond "consumer welfare" would mean expanding protections for rivals and enabling theories of harm based on innovation, choice, access, and other aims not directly tied to consumer pricing and supplier output.

Backing off the "rule of reason," where an antitrust violation may only be found after a careful balancing of pro- and anti-competitive effects demonstrates a net harmful effect on competition, would likely mean more reliance on rebuttable presumptions (based on market shares, etc.) that try to establish what is more akin to a bright-line rule against certain conduct.

Loosening restrictions on bringing standalone claims for "unfair methods of competition" would provide an opening for the FTC to police conduct that is not unlawful under prevailing judicial interpretations of traditional antitrust laws.

#### Cplan solves pharma Affs

Rozga ‘21

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### CP avoids politics

#### CP avoids politics

#### *Even if* the political branches would otherwise hate the Cplan, Agency Guidance docs *won’t face retaliation*.

Raso ‘10

CONNOR N. RASO – J.D., Yale Law School expected 2oo; Ph.D., Stanford University Department of Political Science expected 2010 - “Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents” – Yale Law Journal – v. 119:782 - #E&F - https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5196&context=ylj

Guidance documents generally attract less attention from Congress and the President, giving agency leaders greater latitude to impose their preferred policy choices. Guidance is not subject to the many procedural requirements devised to alert the political branches to agency rulemaking activity. 92 In addition, guidance documents arouse less attention and opposition. Agencies can generally issue a guidance document without attracting advance publicity. The agency therefore has the opportunity to set a new status quo before opponents mobilize. This status quo may generate self-reinforcing feedbacks that strengthen the agency's position. By contrast, agencies must solicit comments on legislative rules. This process generates political activity that may be noticed by Capitol Hill and the White House; some important legislative rulemakings gain political salience as interest group conflict escalates during the notice and comment process. 93 This comparison is not intended to suggest that interest groups are unaware of guidance documents. Rather, at the margin, legislative rules arouse more interest group attention and opposition, which results in greater congressional interest. Guidance documents, therefore, are relatively more attractive in cases where Congress and the President are likely to intervene against the agency.

#### This is uber empirically false

Our 1NC Khan ev is from the FTC Chair – who EXPLICITLY SAID she intends to be more aggressive with Section 5. There’s been no agency stripping or political retal.

## States CP

#### We’ll concede to the perm do both for the states CP but this does not create severance with the Politics DA- the politics DA is not a net benefit to the States CP, test of competition for the aff, kick the arg

# 1NR

### Case

### Innovation

### Uniqueness

**Health innovation high**

**Kenan 6-9** --- Kenan Insight, The Frank Hawkins Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise develops and promotes innovative, market-based solutions to vital economic issues, “Turbocharging Healthcare Innovation”, June 9th 2021, https://kenaninstitute.unc.edu/kenan-insight/turbocharging-healthcare-innovation/

A trajectory of **explosive growth**

The healthcare industry has experienced **extraordinary growth** over the past four decades. **Big pharma** is driving much of this boom, accounting for 10% of the U.S. economy’s overall R&D spending at the end of 2020.1 **The medical device industry**, expected to generate $54.5 billion over the next four years, is another important player.2 This growth is **catching the attention of investor**s. In 2020, health tech startups raised approximately $14 billion in venture capital funding, **nearly double** that of **2019**.3 CB Insights estimates there are now **51 healthcare unicorns**, defined as startups valued at $1 billion or more.

Innovation is a critical driver in the healthcare sector. **Increasing rates of innovation can be seen in the sharp rise of U.S. patents granted** for pharmaceuticals and medical devices in recent years. Between 2013 and 2019, more than 60,000 pharmaceutical patents and more than 125,000 medical device patents were granted.4 Today, there are more than 18,500 drugs at various stages of the development process worldwide.5

Maturing technologies

The increasing numbers of patent applications, clinical trials and collaborations are leading indicators of a **vibrant** and **growing** biopharmaceutical ecosystem. However, the proliferation of **innovation tools**, rather than just innovative products, is what will allow the next generation of pharmaceutical drugs to be discovered more quickly and more efficiently, to provide more effective treatments and to target diseases that have so far evaded our collective intervention efforts. As scientists learn more about human genes and their connection to diseases, these insights can feed into tools that make drug R&D faster, less expensive and more precise.

AI technology has matured to the point where it can now be used reliably to analyze huge amounts of data and solve extremely complex problems. This has made AI attractive to the pharmaceutical industry as a tool that can enable more efficient identification of new drugs and drug targets. In 2020, drug discovery was the focus area that received the most private AI investment, with more than $13.8 billion invested globally. This was 4.5 times higher than the total for 2019.6

CRISPR gene editing is another hot technology that is enabling the development of more innovative and accurate therapeutic strategies. This tool is making it easier to determine the genes and proteins that cause or prevent disease and thus to identify new targets for potential drugs. As of the second quarter of 2020, there were 724 active companies around the world focused on using or developing CRISPR technology and almost 50 clinical trials involving CRISPR.7

mRNA was certainly one of the brightest technology stars of 2020. After decades of research, mRNA proved to be the ideal solution for developing a highly effective COVID-19 vaccine at record speed. However, this is likely only the beginning of the story for mRNA. Therapies based on mRNA technology are being developed to treat malaria, cancer and multiple sclerosis and we’ll likely see more mRNA-based vaccines designed to fight a host of current and future infectious diseases. As of February 2021, CB Insights reports more than 520 ongoing clinical trials worldwide that were applying mRNA technology to more than 20 disease classes.8

Connectivity is the future

For medical devices, the number of regulatory approvals for product refinements has been decreasing while approvals for **completely new devices are growing.** Much of the innovation in this sector is propelled by digitization and connectivity. For example, wearable devices that provide real-time tracking of various aspects of health, such as sleep and physical activity, have seen a surge of investment. According to Grand View Research, the global wearable medical devices market reached $16.6 billion in 2020, with an expected compound annual growth rate of 26.8% between 2021 and 2028.9

The medical devices sector is increasingly focused on racial, ethnic and gender diversity because understanding demographic differences is important to achieving better health outcomes. Ensuring diversity within R&D groups can help ensure that innovations are addressing the healthcare issues of underrepresented groups. Women inventors, for example, are in a unique position to recognize the opportunity and need for better diagnosis and treatment of female diseases and health conditions. According to a new report by Grand View Research, the global market for technology focused on women’s health is expected to reach $48 billion by 2027.10

**The rise of telemedicine**

During the COVID-19 pandemic, healthcare providers quickly ramped up their capabilities to support videoconferencing, telecommuting and remote interactivity. The quick pivot from in-person patient visits to remote interactions led to a record amount of private funding for telehealth startups in 2020. Although these technologies have, and will continue to, foster contactless and remote healthcare, they also come with some risks. With more health data being gathered and transmitted outside of traditional healthcare system networks comes more opportunities for data breaches. In the U.S., the fourth quarter of 2020 saw 154 healthcare data breaches affecting 500 people or more, compared to just 30 such breaches in the first quarter of 2019.11

Blockchain technology is being considered as a potential solution to cybersecurity issues.12 Blockchains store data in blocks that are then chained together and can be used to create an interoperable infrastructure to manage health records while maintaining patient data ownership without compromising privacy. Several nations in Europe, the Middle East and Asia are evaluating ways to integrate blockchains into healthcare.13,14

As we begin to look ahead to what life will be like after COVID-19, it’s very likely that it will never be quite like it was before the pandemic. But it’s clear that the healthcare innovations that were pushed ahead at a record pace during the crisis will **help improve lives around the world for years to come.**

#### Pharma innovation high --- but plan collapses it

Gray 20 --- Gray is a family-owned, fully integrated global service provider specializing in engineering, design, construction, smart manufacturing, and equipment manufacturing, “U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry Maintaining Global Leadership”, Oct 22, 2020, https://www.gray.com/insights/assuring-the-global-leadership-of-the-u-s-pharmaceutical-industry/

The pharmaceutical industry is a key part of the U.S. economy, with an expected value of $685.45 billion by 2023. Steady growth is driven by an aging and growing population, rising income levels, new markets abroad, and emerging illnesses or diseases that require treatment. At least for the short term, the U.S. is expected to retain its leading position in the global pharmaceuticals market, with a market share of 43.72% by 2023.

However, other nations—especially China—are eager to increase their share of the pharmaceutical market. This includes not only manufacturing, but also innovation and drug discovery—a category the U.S. has long dominated.

Although still at the top, U.S. biopharmaceutical manufacturing output has fallen by almost one-third over the last decade as the U.S. trade deficit in drugs and inputs has increased. Additional negative impacts have come from COVID-19, U.S.-China trade battles, supply chain disruptions, and regulatory changes.

“Fortunately, though,” says Stephen Ezell, vice president of global innovation policy for the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), “America still leads in innovation and drug development. This is largely due to significant federal investment in life-sciences research, robust intellectual property (IP) protections, effective technology transfer policies, investment incentives, and, importantly, drug pricing policies that enable companies to invest in high-risk drug development.”

Staying Innovative and Competitive

That said, the U.S. pharma industry is vulnerable, especially regarding innovation. The federal government’s plan to implement cost-control policies, along with more restrictive rules, will likely delay drug approvals and erode prices, which will have negative impacts on the growth of the U.S. pharmaceuticals industry. In addition, pharmaceutical companies have reduced their research and development (R&D) spending due to slower growth in recent years, especially regarding new drug discoveries.

### China ADV

### Impact --- Deterrence

**Innovation gap allows dominate US Navy --- destroys deterrence**

Cropsey 19 --- Seth Cropsey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute and director of Hudson’s Center for American Seapower. He served as a naval officer and as deputy undersecretary of the U.S. Navy in the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations, “Losing 5G fight with China would be a disaster for US”, Hill, March 20th 2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/434774-losing-5g-fight-with-china-would-be-a-disaster-for-us

China has several reasons to master 5G before anyone. The first is pride: With their reputation for copying and stealing from others, it would provide national satisfaction to outwit the competition. The second reason is money: 5G will allow the development and testing of technologies that, today, are difficult or impossible to monetize, much less mine for future application, such as self-driven cars and surveillance systems enhanced by artificial intelligence.

A third reason is security — though, in China’s case, the word “**control**” is more accurate: 5G will allow **unprecedented state surveillance** at near instantaneous speeds, with virtually no delay in messaging. Our capacity to hinder China’s perfection of an Orwellian state and use that power to retain its unchallenged dominance of the Chinese people is limited. And Chinese dominance in 5G will add to its already considerable offensive military capability.

**This is not a matter of speculation**. The Wall Street Journal reported March 13 on China’s massive, ongoing cyber attacks against the U.S. Navy, the military branch best positioned to deter China’s growing regional aggression. One senior Navy official stated: “We are under siege,” dating at least to a 2006 Chinese cyber attack against the U.S. Naval War College that shut down its computer system for nearly two weeks. Chinese dominance in 5G would **significantly assist in future attacks against not only the Navy but the entire U.S. military**, thus **degrading our ability to deter war with China.**

The U.S. ability to **encourage innovation** should provide important advantages in applying 5G technology to revolutionize such fields as robotics, swarming military drones and such other defense applications as non-kinetic warfare, medical support, communications, cyber warfare, intelligence and targeting mobile platforms.

**Tech innovation leadership key to national security and deterrence**

Engelke 18 --- Peter Engelke is a resident senior fellow with the Strategic Foresight Initiative at the Atlantic Council., “American power at stake in great innovation race”, Hill, 06/27/18, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/394363-american-power-at-stake-in-great-innovation-race

China, America’s greatest economic and geopolitical rival, is at the forefront of this global competition. China is no longer content to be either the world’s low-cost manufacturer or its great technological copycat. Rather, it regards tech-innovation leadership in strategic terms, as a critical piece of its lofty superpower ambitions.

China’s rise in tech development is nothing short of astonishing, owing to heavy public R&D funding (now at $233 billion annually, second in the world behind only the U.S.), targeted support of specific technologies such as artificial intelligence and robotics, long-term planning and investment and of course, the sheer size of China’s emerging consumer market.

Nor is China alone. Friends and rivals alike are all players in the global innovation economy. They include the largest, wealthiest and most technologically advanced countries including Germany, Japan, France, Great Britain and South Korea.

They include small but highly competitive countries such as Sweden, Israel and Singapore. And they even include countries that most people in the U.S. would not associate with innovativeness but which are attempting — with varying levels of success — to reach the top tier, including Russia, Brazil, Kenya, Mexico and many more.

Even tiny Rwanda, the site of horrific violence during the 1990s, has developed a reputation here for its desire to participate in innovation.

The global tech-innovation economy therefore is more than a just crowded place. It is also crowded where it counts: at the very top, where it no longer can be said that the U.S. stands alone. Several of the countries listed here, plus others, routinely score higher than the United States in global innovation rankings.

Although China still has some ways to go to reach its goals, it is increasingly difficult to see it failing to match or even exceed the U.S., given China’s resources, size and breathtaking ambition.

The consequences for America’s position in the world — whether geostrategic, economic or otherwise — **are profound.** America’s security rests to a great extent on whether it can continue to produce the best military technologies and to counter those from other countries.

Its economic fortunes rest as well on its ability to produce cutting-edge, commercially viable technologies through innovation and on adapting its workforce to the requirements of this century’s tech-centric economy. **American power, its ability to influence where the world is heading, is at stake.**

### Politics DA

### O/V

#### Disad outweighs and turns case:

#### First, timeframe – is just a week and a half before perceptual harm triggers irreversible impact cascades – whether by accidental default or market overreaction

#### Second – scope – financial crisis encompasses all of their internal links and impacts, but on an economy-wide scale – AND externally triggers nuclear conflicts in every hotspot, environmental disasters both bigger and faster than warming, AND accelerates warming – causes cascading critical infrastructure failures – collapses global and regional alliances – and spurs democratic backsliding and global authoritarian crackdowns – all existential

#### Link alone turns case – guts fiscal capacity AND gridlocks political and law enforcement institutions, making plan’s implementation and enforcement impossible – despite durable fiat

#### McConnell and the Senate GOP will NOT cave – they actively want to risk default to make Biden look incompetent – and hope forcing them to use reconciliation ends up wrecking the Omnibus spending bill – BOTH of which they see as more important to their midterm chances than the risk of default, which they mistakenly think is overblown – that’s Hartmann

#### There’s NO negotiation – they’re out

Risen 9-30-21 (Clay Risen, reporter and editor at The New York Times, graduate of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service and the University of Chicago, “How the Debt Ceiling Came to Be a Political Cudgel,” New York Times, 9-28-2021, updated 9-30-2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/28/us/politics/debt-ceiling-democrats-republicans-history.html)

As my colleague Jim Tankersley has noted, this time there’s no demand from the Republicans, no attempt to win concessions from the Democrats. They simply refuse to engage with the issue. And the Democrats, who see the mounting debt as at least partly the result of Donald Trump’s 2017 tax cuts, but who could also act unilaterally to raise the limit, are holding out, in hope of forcing the Republicans to vote for the debt increase and therefore own a piece of it.

The whole situation has a darkly comic, Strangelovian aura about it, if “Dr. Strangelove” were about fiscal policy instead of nuclear Armageddon. Consider a comment by Mitch McConnell, the Senate minority leader, at a news conference last week.

“America must never default — we never have, and we never will,” he said. “The debt ceiling will be raised, as it always should be. But it will be raised by the Democrats.”

In other words, the Republicans are openly abdicating their responsibility to govern in order to win political points. (A recent Morning Consult/Politico poll found that in the case of a default, 33 percent of voters would blame Democrats, 42 percent would blame both parties and only 16 percent would blame Republicans.) Unlike in the past, there’s no real principle involved, not even a fig leaf about fighting the deficit or pulling in rampant spending. It’s pure politics, with both parties eyeing the midterms and trying to maneuver the other side into taking a hit.

The Democrats’ latest attempt to draw in the Republicans came Monday, when the Senate took up a bill to continue funding the government — an absolute necessity by Sept. 30 — with a temporary increase in the debt ceiling, along with disaster-relief assistance and funding for refugee resettlement. But since it’s a conventional piece of legislation, the Republicans blocked it with the threat of a filibuster.

That leaves the Democrats with few options but to use the budget reconciliation process to lift the ceiling, adding to the party’s long to-do list in the coming days. It’s time consuming, but absent a colossal mistake by congressional leaders, it will happen, just as Mr. McConnell promised.

If that’s the case, what’s the big deal? Republicans say they’ll use the vote to attack Democrats during the midterms, but it’s hard to imagine making it stick, especially since the vote is about paying existing obligations, not creating new ones with more spending. There’s a good chance that a year from now, no one will be talking about it.

#### BOTH Schumer AND Pelosi will pivot to reconciliation in the next couple days – they know they’re running out of time and that reconciliation’s the only option left – that’s Myers

#### They’ve admitted it privately – even if not yet publicly

Everett 9-28-21 (John Burgess Everett, co-congressional bureau chief for POLITICO, specializing in the Senate, BA journalism, University of Maryland College Park; and Heather Caygle, Congress reporter for POLITICO, former congressional reporter for Bloomberg BNA, MA American University in Washington, BA University of Alabama at Birmingham; “Democrats agonize over debt limit options amid GOP blockade,” POLITICO, 9-28-2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/09/28/biden-debt-ceiling-strategy-514469)

Democratic leaders keep ruling out what may be the only way to avoid a debt default, leaving lawmakers and financial markets uncertain of how a dramatic clash with Republicans over raising the debt ceiling will play out.

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer seemed to shut the door on using budget reconciliation to raise the debt ceiling. Instead, he is leaning on Republicans to stop blocking a debt limit increase as the country creeps closer and closer to cataclysmic debt limit breach in three weeks.

Schumer concluded on Tuesday afternoon that “going through reconciliation is risky to the country and is a non-starter.” Speaker Nancy Pelosi said Schumer’s position is “shared by many members” but declined to say if she supports the idea or aligns herself directly with Schumer: “We’ll see what our options are."

There’s mass confusion among congressional Democrats about how the majority party and its slim majorities will avoid a potential default just three weeks away. Senate Republicans on Monday sank Democrats' plan to fund the government into December and kick the debt limit through the 2022 midterms, then they blocked an effort from Schumer to lift the debt ceiling by a majority vote on Tuesday.

Consternation over the debt limit is reaching the highest levels of Democratic leadership as uncertainty hangs over Congress. President Joe Biden discussed the possibility of raising the debt ceiling via budget reconciliation on Monday evening on a telephone call with Pelosi and Schumer, the latest sign that Democrats are searching for a way around entrenched GOP opposition.

No final decision was made on the call, according to two Democrats familiar with the conversation. But the GOP’s stubborn opposition to raising the debt ceiling has Democrats fuming as they search for a way to avoid a shutdown on Friday and a default in October.

“We may have to use reconciliation. I think that would be a sad statement of Republican responsibility,” conceded House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer. He later walked that back and said it was “not the option we’re pursuing.” Privately, however, Democrats say congressional leaders are not ruling it out as it may be the only way around the Senate GOP.

Reconciliation allows Democrats to avoid a GOP filibuster, but requires close coordination between the House and Senate and could take weeks. Schumer has been walking his caucus through how cumbersome it could be to use the arcane budget process to raise the debt ceiling and the many pitfalls ahead if leaders choose to follow that route.

Democrats are likely to pass a government funding bill without the debt ceiling attached to head off a shutdown this week. But that doesn’t mean they are committed to using reconciliation to lift the debt ceiling. Instead, Schumer has warned his caucus that the gambit would be “burdensome and untenable,” according to one of the Democrats.

“Using reconciliation is a non-starter. We have gone through it twice, I’ve listened, and it takes him about 15 minutes for Chuck Schumer to explain how that works, what it involves. Three or four weeks of activity in the House and Senate,” said Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.).

There's little time to waste. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned Congress on Tuesday that lawmakers must raise the debt ceiling by around Oct. 18 to avoid a debt default. That means Democrats would need to start moving on the time-consuming reconciliation process in the coming days to avoid a default, should they choose that path over continuing confrontation with Republicans.

On Tuesday, Schumer asked Senate Republicans to allow a standalone vote on the debt limit at a majority threshold rather than the typically needed 60 votes, though Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell rejected that ask. Though he has pushed Democrats to raise the debt limit on their own, McConnell prefers they use budget reconciliation, a more excruciating maneuver.

“Leader Schumer wants Democrats to be able to do it alone if Republicans refuse to help. So that's really what is being pursued at this point in time,” said White House press secretary Jen Psaki. She pleaded for McConnell to “get out of the way and let Democrats do it alone.”

Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) made clear that Republicans are intent on making it as difficult as possible for Democrats to raise the debt ceiling — even as they insist Democrats do it all on their own .

“When this fails I fully expect Schumer will surrender and do what he could have done weeks or months ago, which is raise the debt ceiling with Democratic votes,” Cruz said.

When asked why not just allow Schumer to do exactly that on Tuesday rather than force Democrats to pursue reconciliation, he responded: “He wants consent because all 50 Republicans would have to consent. It’s the same game and he knows the outcome.”

#### NO thumpers – infrastructure and everything else is dead – at least for now – focusing PC on debt ceiling

ZB 9-30-21 (ZubuBrothers, market knowledge service that publishes staff-written pieces as well as aggregating news, commentary & opinions from external sources, “Senate Strikes Deal To Avert Shutdown, But Remains Deadlocked On Debt-Ceiling, Domestic Agenda,” 9-30-2021, https://zububrothers.com/2021/09/30/senate-strikes-deal-to-avert-shutdown-but-remains-deadlocked-on-debt-ceiling-domestic-agenda/?amp=1)

Now that Sen. Joe Manchin has denounced his own party’s multi-trillion plan to expand the social safety net as “the definition of fiscal insanity,” we can be virtually assured that the entire Democratic domestic agenda has essentially been left dead in the water, since the progressive Left won’t agree to back the Dems’ “bipartisan” infrastructure plan via reconciliation without first passing the larger spending package through both chambers.

Whatever the outcome, Manchin’s statement suggests it will likely take weeks and months – not days – for President Biden and the leadership to negotiate the votes – if indeed they can ever resolve the intractable divide within their own party, which has largely taken the form of aggressive leftists in the House (exemplified by the AOC-led “squad”) vs. a pair of moderates (Manchin and Arizona’s Kyrsten Sinema) in the Senate.

That’s fortunate, in a sense, since it means Chuck Schumer and Nancy Pelosi will have no choice but to focus on the arguably more pressing priorities: keeping the government funded while raising the debt ceiling, ideally before Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s “drop-dead” date of Oct. 18.

(And, of course, placing some hedging trades during last night’s Congressional baseball game).

**[TWEET OMITTED]**

With the Democrats heading for an iceberg of a vote on the infrastructure package Thursday that the left has already promised to sink, Schumer announced late Wednesday night that, at the very least, the leadership had secured a deal to extend funding for the federal government until Dec. 3, crossing off arguably the easiest thing on their “to do” list.

The deadline for the shutdown is midnight tonight (because the new fiscal year starts tomorrow).

“We have an agreement on the the continuing resolution to prevent a government shutdown, and we should be voting on that tomorrow [Thursday] morning,” Schumer said.

The House passed a government funding bill last week on a party-line vote of 220-211.

Now that the spending package has been stripped of Republican-opposed language suspending the debt-ceiling (which analysts fear will only be resolved much, much closer to Yellen’s deadline, which is really the start of a countdown before the money actually runs out) the leadership believes it has the votes to pass a “clean” continuing resolution to fund the government in a series of Thursday-morning votes.

Asked about the progressives’ plans to sink the infrastructure package, Manchin told reporters “I didn’t know I was on their timetable”, referring to the progressive leftists, whose rebellion has threatened to irreparably damage the Biden presidency.

Progressives, led by Washington’s Pramila Jayapal, say they have enough votes in the House to sink the infrastructure package, which has already passed the Senate, but Pelosi appears undeterred. “The plan is to bring the bill to the floor,” she told reporters after returning from a White House meeting with Biden and Schumer yesterday afternoon.

As for the larger spending bill, a few compromise numbers have been thrown around. One reporter said during yesterday’s WH press conference that the heard $2.5 trillion might be a workable number. Manchin has meanwhile hinted he could back $1.5 trillion while Sinema has been more circumspect. The debt ceiling has already passed the House, but remains stuck in the Senate, where Minority Leader Mitch McConnell has managed to get his entire caucus to vote against it, while Dems have said they are unwilling to use the same “reconciliation” short-cut to get the debt-ceiling deal done (which would use up valuable political capital).

As Thursday begins, get ready for another day of non-stop headlines on every marginal development on the Dems’ negotiations, as talks grind on.

#### They’re all priced in regardless – PC may be stretched to the breaking point, BUT only plan’s fiat overcomes selectivity and opens a new partisan battlefront

MIN News 9-16-21 (MIN News, up-to-the-minute news with a focus on global news with an impartial perspective, “The eve of the U.S. Riot,” 9-16-2021, https://min.news/en/world/fdc7c0db566ff0f75dadb19e71f8212b.html)

According to the latest media report on Wednesday (September 8), as US President Biden has no new measures to express the renewal, on September 6 this year, the government's fixed weekly aid payment of 300 US dollars has expired and the disbursement has been terminated. .

However, this Tuesday (September 7), the White House of the United States said that each state can consider whether to extend the grant period according to their own circumstances. If some states want to provide welfare payments to those in need, the White House will continue to support it.

In fact, the United States has also tried before the relief fund expires, but either the relief fund has a smaller scope of impact, or the new bill will be extended soon after it expires. The suspension of unemployment assistance has affected more than 11 million people in the country, including 4.2 million casual workers and 3.3 million long-term unemployed.

So why did the United States not introduce a new bill to extend the bailout when it expired? That's because the US government is working hard to promote the passage of the $1 trillion infrastructure bill and the $3.5 trillion budget to further boost the country's economy. In addition, the country is burdened with 28.7 trillion U.S. dollars in debt and is facing the risk of debt default. There is really no extra energy and money to solve the problem of unemployment assistance.

We must know that the current labor participation rate in the United States is sluggish. As of the end of June this year, there were 10.1 million employment gaps in the country. If relief payments continue, it will only further hinder the release of the country's labor force. It is reported that among the 50 states in the United States, 24 states have stopped distributing benefits.

However, this is not a good solution to the employment problem. If the more than 10 million employment gap can be filled by someone, it would have been filled long ago. Those in need of government relief do not have many labor skills. There are a large number of idlers, drug addicts and anti-social workers in the United States. These people are unwilling to go to work. They just ask for money from the government. Once this group of people cannot get relief from the government, they will naturally go to society to rob them. These poor Americans will have their lives left, and they will become Americans. Serious instability factors.

This is in sharp contrast to the Biden administration's attitude towards the “suspended deportation order” in early August. American housing tenants face the risk of being evicted from their housing if they default on rent. Since the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, a large number of tenants have struggled to pay rent on time. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a "suspended eviction order" last September, saving millions of tenants from going out.

At the end of July this year, the "suspended deportation order" expired, and the progressives in the Democratic Party unanimously asked Biden to postpone. The Biden administration also made active efforts for the postponement and successfully extended it for two months. Although the Supreme Court ended the “suspended deportation order” with a 6-3 ruling at the end of August, the then Biden administration did at least make it as long as possible.

Since major states suspended relief payments, many U.S. citizens have expressed dissatisfaction, because there is a long transition period from looking for a job to getting a salary, and rushing to stop the relief payments is detrimental to the normal life of American citizens. Influence. Moreover, some American citizens, because of the sequelae of pneumonia, are unable to perform high-intensity work on their own and stop distributing relief funds. These citizens can only find unsafe jobs with salaries far below the cost of living.

In order to help American citizens through the embarrassing period, the major states have also given 30 days of transition time, but many people say that 30 days are not sufficient at all. Sometimes it may take two months to find a suitable job. During this period, the unemployed people who have no economic income will inevitably lose their income, which will have a serious impact on their lives. And they have to pay a lot of expenses in the past two months, not only for living expenses, but also for some mortgage payments. This government decision will destroy the lives of many people.

And now, the Biden administration must promote the smooth passage of the bipartisan cooperation infrastructure bill and the US$3.5 trillion budget before the end of September to boost Biden's repeated low support rates after the epidemic rebounded and Afghanistan's defeat. At the same time, the Democrats must negotiate with the Republicans in Congress to raise the debt ceiling and avoid government shutdowns. The tight timetable and severely shrinking political capital have made the Biden administration unable to open up a new battlefield on the issue of unemployment benefits.